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Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the
Hypothesis of the Future

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PART I

THE PROBLEM AND BONHOEFFER'S RESOLUTION

CHAPTER ONE

BONHOEFFER'S CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHY

This dissertation deals with an issue in epistemology and will relate itself explicitly to the works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The issue to be dealt with is that of the resources by which the self claims to have knowledge. The issue is not a question of the sources of evidence, calling for a catalogue; nor is it a question of the faculties of the soul, calling for a psychology. It is not a question which can be answered phenomenologically by detailing the kind of claims which appear as knowledge; nor is it a linguistic question of the best uses of the word "knowledge." It is a question which can make claims at least as sweeping as Heidegger makes for "his" question of why there are beings rather than nothing, yet it is also a question which will not advance Heidegger's claims. It seeks to know whether it is possible for genuine knowledge to arise in a situation in which the self has no object other than itself and no claims to recognize except its own.

Of central importance for an appreciation of Bonhoeffer's contribution to the history of philosophy is his first major work, Act and Being. Our concern with this work will have two aspects. First we shall trace Bonhoeffer's critical appreciation of the role of epistemology in modern philosophy. For this task we shall be dealing with Bonhoeffer's critiques of several major figures in the philosophical tradition from Kant to the present. Second we shall reconstruct Bonhoeffer's original contribution to the epistemological issues of this portion of the tradition. This double concern with Bonhoeffer will constitute the first and second chapters of this dissertation, and will generate what shall be called the "hypothesis of the future." The remainder of the dissertation will define and explore the legitimate domain of this hypothesis.

Bonhoeffer's formulation, "act and being," involves the alternatives of transcendental philosophy and ontology. Ontology, as e.g. Heidegger's, allows itself the employment of concepts whose legitimate employment brings ontological levels (such as Being) to the disposal of consciousness, and, although what he calls the brutal mishandling of Being is condemned by Heidegger, we are given to understand that, strictly speaking, it is possible for man to interfere with Being. Transcendental philosophy, on the other hand, renounces "the proud name of Ontology."[1] Here interference with Being is unthinkable; that is not to say it is forbidden, but rather that it is impossible. Our distinction then might seem to be equivalent to a consciousness-being distinction. But Bonhoeffer urges caution here, for consciousness makes the conscious an ontological level. The issue would on such a ground become one between two ontological levels, rather than genuinely between ontology itself and transcendentalism.[2]

The project of this chapter, then, shall be to understand how transcendentalism and ontology are genuine alternatives for epistemology. The understanding of the sense in which these are alternatives is to be handled thus: insofar as knowledge establishes itself in contradistinction to both ignorance and error, yet admits the possibility of both, it contains the necessity either of the knowing subject to transcend the known or of the known to transcend the knowing subject. The paradigm case of the former is transcendentalism. The paradigm case of the latter is ontology. Hence Bonhoeffer's alternatives. This first chapter then comprises critiques of both the transcendental and ontological positions. It is important to note that regarding such accounts Bonhoeffer warns us:

> All that follows below by way of representing Kantian or idealist philosophy is stylized (and therefore dispenses with quotations). Kant is represented as a pure transcendental philosopher, which he never was entirely, though we believe he intended to be one. It is the system we debate, not matters of historical fact.[3]

The alternatives of transcendentalism and ontology are to be treated as they occur in the philosophical tradition. Bonhoeffer thus characterizes Kant and Hegel as representing the transcendental position. Of greatest significance for the second alternative is Heidegger. Bonhoeffer introduces his discussion of Heidegger with a brief treatment of Husserl. Finally, as representative of abortive attempts to overcome the transcendental-ontological distinction, Przywara is treated.

Transcendentalism in the sense in which Bonhoeffer first wishes to discuss it refers not to neo- and post-Kantianism alone, but to the philosophical advances made by Kant in working out the issues presented to him in his historical context, issues tracing not merely to Hume and Leibniz, but at least to early Scholasticism. Its principle tenet is that thought refers to something transcendental, yet does not have the transcendental at its disposal. This reference may be either retrospective, i.e., in thought's claiming a meaning it cannot give itself; or prospective, in thought's claiming reference to an object over against it. Dasein, for transcendentalism, is the being-amid two transcendental poles, both as a state of fact and of awareness, a being-amid that arises from the will to self-understanding. This of course is the raison d'etre for a critique of pure reason. Yet because reason does not establish its limits in reference to the transcendental (this being not at reason's disposal) but only in reference to itself, its "original rights"--by which Bonhoeffer means its unrestricted claims--have been maintained. If transcendentalism is to succeed it must overcome this contradiction.

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Of great importance here is the fact that from the point of view of transcendentalism man is pure act, understanding himself from "self-imposed bounds."[4] To be sure, Kant accepts the presence of "objects" to us, but only in the sense of "presence" described by phenomenalism. The validity of knowledge hence depends not on correspondence with phenomena, either of knowledge or of the object, but on the necessity of the _a priori_ synthesis which unites phenomena. Thus truth is in the pure (logical) act, and the existence of the object can be affirmed only with reference to knowing. But that is not to say that Being is "only by virtue of" knowing or "through" knowing. Reason, for Kant, is not qualified to assert the latter. Bonhoeffer's criticism is that in this disqualification reason's "original rights" are not really curtailed, and the transcendental reference is maintained. From the point of view of Kantian philosophy the primacy of act is also maintained in permanent reference to the transcendent. This reference, it must be carefully noted, is not an accomplished reference. Rather it would be better to call it a referring, in order to emphasize that it is a continuing effort in act, and not an accomplished state of being. As such it must continue to sustain itself in an activity which can never cease. We might conclude from this that if this reference were ever to be accomplished, rendered explicit, act would complete itself, and man's existence, insofar as it has been defined as this continued referring, would collapse. That is, so long as man's existence is defined as depending on his referring to something which is other to and transcendent of him, man's self-knowledge must remain incomplete; for if the self were an object of complete knowledge, it would be complete, no longer "with reference to." Hence human reason can never fully understand itself as pure act.

This briefly is Bonhoeffer's critique of Kantian transcendentalism. Either the transcendent is available to reason or it is not. If not, how can it be given so significant a role in Kantian philosophy? If it is, then reason's impotence before the _Ding_-_an_-_sich_ is merely honorific, and not true impotence. In either case reason has met no truly inviolable other. But to continue Bonhoeffer's critique we must mention two alternatives which arise here.

On the one hand thought may suspend itself before the I. That is, thought may recognize that the I as the source of pure judgment is prior to thought. Yet it is by thought itself that thought is restricted, by itself choosing to honor this recognized limitation. Here thought chooses not to, as it were, invade the I. This choice is a self-limitation, and the original rights or unrestricted claims of thought are not curtailed by any agency external to thought. This Bonhoeffer claims is the "original design" of Kant, although admittedly not to be extracted from the historical Kant.[5] On the other hand, thought may choose another alternative, the Hegelian alternative, namely self-promotion, making the self-thinking I its foundation. Hereby however, reality and transcendence are overpowered and "with reference to" is lost. Thought becomes self-concerned, unable to escape its own immensity. And here the self-delight of spirit, as Löwith says, passes over into the sickness unto death.[6] The self may refer only to itself and to its unlimited capacity to choose among alternatives of laws. The idea of methodological operators which substitute for ontological barriers, such as the thing-in-itself, is abandoned. There are no criteria, no rules, which it has not given itself. Therefore there are no priorities which it must observe. The "original rights" of thought have been asserted, but at the cost of the Kantian sense of presence: there is no longer any presence which represents genuine otherness. Thought has only itself to entertain, only its own random amusements to satisfy, only its own petulance to disrupt it.

The latter alternative, Bonhoeffer remarks, relies heavily in its mythical statement on the concept of thought as homecoming, for if thought is act, and if not all kinds of thought are equally meritorious, some kind must be preferred. The achievement of this kind can only be a homecoming, a self-discovery and -residence, i.e., to refer again to Hegelian terms, the achievement of substantiality. It is thus that Hegel claims that his one argument against Spinoza is Spinoza's failure to make substance subjectivity.[7]

Which of these major alternatives one chooses, however, whether thought self-demeaning or self-honoring is a matter for practical reason, according to Bonhoeffer. That is to say it is an ethical matter; but that is not to say it is a choice between two equally worthy alternatives. It is an "ethical" matter because it involves two alternatives which are, at least for this point of view, mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, yet the decision concerning which makes all the difference for Dasein. If, as we have seen, thought is defined to operate in the domain of act, it must choose whether it will honor any otherness as legitimate. But it cannot really choose to do so, except tentatively and preliminarily, for even to choose to do so is to fail to do so, for it is to say that the matter is not a matter of the other, but is a matter for thought to decide. Thought cannot surreptitiously "consult" the object here. Here the choice even to restrict the original rights of thought reaffirms them.

As an "ethical" matter Bonhoeffer means here to criticize "self-approval" as the sanction for thought's activity in Hegelian philosophy. Bonhoeffer has already made some preliminary sorties against Hegel by hinting that the self-approval of reason's choosing among equally valid laws or sets of laws is no criterion and can only lead to an empty and eventually boring self-concern. Bonhoeffer here makes the stronger claim that "It simply is not true that concrete man (including even the philosopher) is in full possession of the mind."[8] Bonhoeffer here could well refer to the "cunning of Reason" for this provision in Hegel tacitly admits that self-conscious mind is indeed not fully self-possessed. The attempt in Hegel however is to tame the cunning of reason by making it fully self-conscious. A great deal depends on whether one things Hegel made this trick work.

Bonhoeffer caricatures Hegelian man with the remark that

> Whoever countenances the idea that he need only arrive at himself to be in God is doomed to hideous disillusion in experiencing the utter introversion, the treadmill confinement to the self of the very loneliest solitude with its tormenting desolation and sterility.[9]

Furthermore according to Bonhoeffer, Hegelianism does the very worst of jobs when it comes to saving appearances, and the appearance it loses is that which it ought most surely to safeguard, namely the appearance of mind itself:

> Concrete man sees himself placed in a contingent here-or-there as one who has to find his whereabouts by asking, thinking, and doing, one who has to relate to himself the position pregiven to him and at the same time define himself "with reference to" it. And the imposition, the outrage, which man feels at "being already" "with reference to" some other thing which transcends him--is something essentially different from a certainty of bearing within himself the possibility of mastering the world.[10]

Furthermore idealism belies its Kantian origin, for the Kantian attempt to position the act-character of thought at the center of the philosophical enterprise has been abandoned. Here then Bonhoeffer considers Kantianism a more nearly genuine transcendental enterprise than Hegelianism.

> In sum, even the character of the act, what is means to be an agent, is more purely expressed in the genuine transcendental understanding of existence than in the idealist's conflation of act and being. Only when existence supposed in permanent orientation to transcendence is said not to be able to understand itself (or only to understand that it does not understand itself) is the true sense of the act expressed: act as an ever-shifting "with reference to," as utter intentionality, as something which gives proof of itself in the psychic process but is only to be understood on the far side of it, act as direct consciousness--*actus directus*. Here philosophizing itself has an essential connection with existence, and this can be so because it places itself within the responsibility of human existence and frames questions only from out that context; accordingly the question itself is proper to existence and does not involve the answer beforehand. Thus philosophizing partakes of the act-character of existence and does not make statements from an existing stock of properties such as might inhere in a "being."[11]

Hegelianism then in Bonhoeffer's view has betrayed its roots: if philosophy is to be inquiry, one must be willing to learn and not pretend that one already knows; one may not pretend philosophy is merely an *Auslegung*. If it is to be dialogue, one may not insist on the last word by claiming an absolute standpoint. The account of consciousness Hegel gives completely fails to reflect the nature of thought as act and is, quite contrary to its announced intentions, thoroughly ontological.

As a critique, Bonhoeffer's remarks here seem to obscure the fact that Hegel considered his system a further development of Kant's, requiring Kant's transcendental turn, yet rejecting much of the machinery, such as the faculty psychology and the Thing-in-itself. What then is the source of the discontinuity? The decisive difference between Kant and Hegel Bonhoeffer takes to be of the following sort. For Kantian transcendentalism the world refers to the knowing subject and must be thought therefore "in reference to" the knowing subject. Hegelian idealism takes this reference to connote dependence: the world is thought to exist by the existing subject, and hence to exist through the existing subject. Thus idealism turns the transcendental thesis into an expression of the self-causal efficacy in the world. "This is a distinction which should not be disregarded in the study of systems merely because it remains blurred in the history of philosophy."[12]

This briefly then is Bonhoeffer's critique of the Hegelian contribution to the transcendental hypothesis. But what can Bonhoeffer say concerning the possibility of transcendental philosophy in general? Going outside the present framework somewhat, we may assert that Bonhoeffer claims that transcendentalism honors the "all-important frontier of creaturehood."[13] That is to say it observes a boundary very important for any Christian philosophy, the boundary between the freedom of man and the absolute sovereignty of God. This however, while an interesting conclusion, must remain somewhat peripheral to the issue at hand, for it cannot be proven from the transcendental framework. Remaining within the framework we must say that God is non-objective, available only to the act-subject. Thus while transcendentalism may honor the "all-important frontier of creaturehood," it cannot properly be said to establish it.

God, in the system of transcendentalism, like the I, must remain a logical entity, an object of the transcendental logic, to which thought may have reference but which it cannot incorporate. This raises the more general philosophical question of the nature of transcendental reference. Just what is this reference, so important to modern philosophy? If, as is the case for transcendentalism, the transcendental referent is not objectively knowable, how can thought ever use this referent as a sign of its own limits? Indeed Bonhoeffer concludes it cannot.

> This inmost obscurity in the Kantian concept of the transcendental leads to the discovery that even here, despite the strenuous attempt to surpass itself or prescribe its own limitations, reason is left alone with itself and so understands itself not "with reference to" that which transcends it, but with back-reference to itself. The miscarriage of this endeavor to ascertain the bounds of reason is due to the fact that essentially reason has no bounds.[14]

Hence for both Kantianism and Hegelianism reason is lost in itself. Its attempts to understand itself have reference only to itself. Its attempts to become aware of God are easily disclosed to be attempts to understand not God but itself. In short its *sum* is its *cogito*. But, Bonhoeffer complains, this is in reality but the "ontic narcissism" of what he calls the *cor curvum in se*, a form of self-imprisonment.[15] The question then is to be formulated thus: Is it possible for the I to understand itself from itself? Or is there some fundamental error in modern philosophy insofar as it takes this to be its goal?

Idealism accepts from transcendentalism the doctrine of the creativity of thought. Self-knowledge then must involve some sort of self-creation, some raising of substance to the subject. This recalls Hegel's attempt to establish the free autonomy of the individual by making him self-aware of the self-constitutive activity of thought. But if self-constitutive activity is to free him, he must recognize ontological categories as his own, not as alien impediments. Hence ontological categories are de-ontologized for Hegel. That is to say, they are not categories over against thought that thought must acknowledge, but are aspects of thought itself.

If the transcendental remains outside the self then, as for Kantian philosophy, it assumes ontological status; that is the only way to preserve its otherness. If it enters into the self as in Hegelian philosophy, it loses its alien (transcendental) status; and the only way to maintain its identity is through ontological labels. Hence neither Kant nor Hegel overcomes ontology.

In the end, furthermore, the transcendentalist-idealist project requires the thesis that like can only be conceived by like. This is the source of the identification of alien and transcendental, and it grows quite naturally out of the Kantian series of accommodations (phenomena, images, representations in general--all accommodate themselves to the mental machinery). But such a thesis, that like can only be conceived by like, requires that ontological concepts be transformed into concepts of the act. This as we have seen is a project neither transcendentalism nor idealism is prepared to carry through. And in the refusal to acknowledge this failure, philosophy has incurred a great loss, namely of the ability to understand 'the concrete, psychophysical man--the man who is at stake in Christian theology, and who invariably finds himself "already there" in his given world.'[16]

Our first alternative, then, the philosophy of act, has two aspects. It may, as is the case with Kantian philosophy, assert the existence of the transcendental object and lose thereby the ability to account for it; or it may appropriate and account for the transcendental and lose thereby the ability to refer to it as "transcendental." Either we have then an object which cannot be accommodated to consciousness, and the Copernican revolution is compromised; or we have none which cannot be, and the Copernican revolution is completed but still brought to grief, for all objects have equal status before thought and no structures of value inhere.

This then completes Bonhoeffer's critique of transcendentalism. We turn now to the next alternative he investigates.

The second major context in which the modern philosophical tradition has treated these issues is Heideggerian ontology. This dissertation now proceeds to an examination of its offerings. The transition from Kantian to Hegelian philosophy was one which ultimately reduced the act-character of knowledge by raising substance to the subject. In the coincidence of essence and existence in Hegel's treatment of mind is to be found the basis for calling mind a substance, i.e., a necessary, self-contained being. But this substance is not yet an object of ontology, for at any given time all aspects of consciousness are ontologically on a par; no hierarchical arrangement occurs at any time, although in the development through time, "progress" occurs.

This brings us to a discussion required for our treatment of the next alternative, for the fact that all aspects of consciousness are on a par as they occur is reproduced in Husserl's phenomenology, where all noemata occur equally and without hierarchical arrangement (that is not to say without structure). However here the activity of the mind must restrict itself in order for the appearing to occur. The creativity or spontaneity of consciousness must reduce itself to receptivity. In principle then, "man has eyes to see." Man has the inherent capacity by a special kind of vision to see through reality's mask of appearance to its genuine appearing. But man's seeing requires a suspension of thought in being. Here then what appeared as a development from Hegelianism is seen to be in some respects an alternative to Hegelianism: instead of appropriating its objects by removing all mediation from between thought and object, as was Hegel's goal, thought for Husserl remains critically involved with its object, thereby maintaining the opposition or otherness.

In many respects this seems, and rightly so, but an arbitrary halting of the Hegelian project. Thought has claims which it can make good vis-a-vis reality. But instead of appropriating reality, thought withdraws its claims. This becomes an arbitrary halting of the Hegelian project, then, insofar as thought has just as much "power" in the Husserlian system as in the Hegelian. But for the former, the Husserlian, this power is self-checking; it thereby remains "potential." In order, however, to assert this alternative, Husserl must bracket the question of reality. True and false ideas, realities and illusions, self-contradictions and mathematical verities--all vie together on an equal basis before consciousness, just as all shapes are equal before vision. Indeed the analogy is hardly accidental, for Wesenschau is a kind of perception.[17]

All interpretation of these essences is artificial. Hence either they must be allowed to remain in mutual isolation or they must be forced to yield a world. In either case the construction of a *Lebenswelt* as involving not merely structure but value as well is purely an undertaking of human consciousness. And the undertaking of any particular project is at once artificial and necessary. Here

> The ὄν has been overcome by the human logos, and there is no more arriving at truly grasped concepts of either being or God. Being as *existentia* is resolved in *essentia*, and the seal is set on the transition to idealism.[18]

Here Bonhoeffer pushes Husserlian phenomenology to its completion in idealism. Yet Husserl himself would not allow his conclusions to be pushed beyond the realm of logic. Here Bonhoeffer's patience with phenomenology is spent. If phenomenology is to produce anything more than random tokens of a lost worldhood, it must create a system. Mere '"picture-book phenomenology"' will not do.[19] Concerned as we are here for "concrete, psychophysical man" we can only insist at this point that philosophy which brackets the question of reality is simply not philosophy. The question of reality is simply one which a concern for concrete *Dasein* cannot ignore. The question of what is apparent and what is really appearing, between *Schein* and *Erscheinung* in Hegelian terms, is a difficult but legitimate one. It must be reinstated: for this reason Bonhoeffer abandons his treatment of Husserl in order to deal with Heidegger.

Precisely where Husserl "puts in inverted commas" Heidegger claims to disclose Being, mainly by considering Being temporal. The logical "timeless essentialities" of Husserl are replaced by temporal interpretations, this being

> only possible because the place of Husserl's "pure transcendental consciousness" is taken by the man himself, concretely putting the question of being, the man who is withal an entity in the peculiar form of his own kind of Being: Dasein.[20]

This Dasein, though concrete, has self-understanding as an ontological characteristic. Man's substance is existence, and as such contains a number of "pre-established" determinations: in Heidegger's terms these include already being-in-the-world, already being-with-others, already being thrown, already being committed to live towards death, etc. But Dasein is already guilty of having preferred the quotidian to this commitment. And it summons itself by consciousness to resume its being-toward-death. Here as in idealism Being is mind; but here it is "mind in its historicity."[21] It is here that Being understands itself. Here Being has established its priority over thought; yet as Dasein it is equal to mind.

It would seem then that here the act-being problem has been solved: both Dasein and Being have shown to thought their temporal horizons. No essential or pure potentiality can be attributed to Dasein, and no essential or pure eternality can be attributed to Being. Here even the eternity of God, if it is to be thought at all, must be temporalized.[22] Furthermore the problem of act and being is resolved in Dasein, for Dasein's essence includes the possibility of essential, i.e., authentic decisions which constitute Dasein's authentic essence. Thought here is suspended in Being. But here Bonhoeffer begins to advance serious doubts concerning Heidegger's system, for thought as finite is self-contained for Heidegger. Hence thought's finite presence to Being may equally well be expressed as the presence of Being to thought. There is no automatic preference for either mode of expression. The question must be asked which is present to the other? Or are they indifferently co-present? If there is the logical indifference of co-presence, and if this logical co-presence is thorough, then the agency intrinsic to thought is also intrinsic to Being and Heidegger's whole inquiry concerning Being was mistaken; he should have concerned himself only with God or with some sort of thing-in-itself-in-itself.

The former, theology, is in Bonhoeffer's terms, the legitimate conclusion. The latter, the study of the noumenal *qua* noumenal or of the transcendental *qua* transcendental, leaves thought, as in Bonhoeffer's discussion of Kant, with no inviolable referents. But if thought has no inviolable referents, its honorific deference to Being is self-imposed, just as for Kantianism. Hence once again thought is essentially closed upon itself, without reference to an other against which it can work out its own limits concretely. Is our study of the history of philosophy then unable to discover any position which overcomes "the concept of basically closed being"?[23]

The Thomism of Przywara takes up the hypothesis of the priority of being over consciousness precisely in order to accommodate the transcendence of God. Ontologically Przywara's system interprets God's mode of being as identity of existence and essence and man's mode of being as difference of existence and essence. God thereby exists in his own right, as does man, although the former necessarily, the latter contingently. Thus human existence is treated in finite, temporal terms, but it is not self-enclosed; rather it has authentic reference to an other whose otherness it cannot usurp, namely to God. But what of this other? For Przywara, God becomes a colossal "Is." But if this otherness to which man is to relate is to be efficacious, it must be determinate. Perhaps to say God is holy or just or loving satisfies this claim. To say God is Is surely does not. Przywara's "solution" then is altogether *ad hoc*.

The undertaking as a whole then has involved three alternatives. The first, transcendentalism, as e.g. Kant and Hegel, cannot accomplish a transcendental reference, for it makes transcendence and reference mutually exclusive. The second, ontology, assumes but renders incomprehensible the presence of Being to thought. The third is merely an *ad hoc* attempt to open Being to the transcendental.

Surveying his conclusions regarding these systems, Bonhoeffer asserts:

> That is the inevitable consequence of all systematic metaphysics. Thus even the attempt to open the concept of being to the transcendental terminates in an illusory transcendence. . . . Just as Anselm arrived at a "being," but failing to arrive at God remained in the closed world, Thomist ontology is unable to advance beyond an intramundane metaphysics in its concept of God, so long as it purports to discover possibilities in man of understanding himself, and God via himself--in other words, self-"projection along lines of his authentic potentiality" (Heidegger)--and so long as the world and its idea of God are both contained within the I. . . .[24]

This completes then Bonhoeffer's critique of ontology and allows new insights into the nature of his task.

Here we see Bonhoeffer's primary concern fully formulated as a question relating to the history of modern philosophy as a whole and as a question which challenges a certain kind of philosophical enterprise. This question has been traced epistemologically since it is a question which demands the origins of knowledge.

Our question then asks whether knowledge is possible without transcendence, the transcendence of otherness-which-cannot-be-usurped, but which must be respected in its integrity. Hence in asking of the sources of knowledge we are asking whether the source of knowledge can be wholly internal to consciousness (*Dasein*) or whether consciousness must not have some object against which to establish its limits. Here Spinoza's dictum "Every determination is a negation," which Hegel used to establish the internality of all distinctions, i.e., that all articulations are internal, is converted, and applied to epistemology. Thus, "Every negation is a determination," is used as a motto for rediscovering the unique personal selfhood submerged by Hegelianism. Every negation, every barrier to the movement of thought, is a determination of the nature of thought, for it establishes thought's limits, its perimeter, hence its nature. (The question of whether every limitation establishes a universal aspect of all men's reason is here ignored. It will be considered in chapter three.) The technical term for this presence of barriers whose otherness cannot be usurped is "transcendence." To anticipate somewhat, Bonhoeffer calls the experience of transcendence or the encounter with the transcendent "revelation." The "difference" made by revelation is the difference between "being-in-Adam" and "being-in-Christ." This roughly parallels Heidegger's inauthentic-authentic distinction, but only roughly. But before beginning to discuss Bonhoeffer's terms in any detail, I wish to note here that this concludes the outline of Bonhoeffer's critiques of the indicated philosophical positions. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the conditions which a viable alternative must meet if it is to avoid these same criticisms.

The implication for philosophy of Bonhoeffer's position as so far outlined is that philosophy must acknowledge that man cannot bestow truth on himself, i.e., he cannot attain a complete systematic metaphysics. Therefore in order for philosophy to maintain itself in the face of revelation, it must assume a responsive rather than initiatory or projective position. Philosophy must be in reference to, in response to, a decisive presence.

I feel this is not nearly so novel in philosophy as Bonhoeffer seems to indicate at this point, and that the origin of the impulse to philosophy is to be sought in the encounter with a "presence" alien to natural consciousness, although not necessarily personal. If philosophy merely takes up the alien, it becomes mysticism, and the "appearances" which constitute natural consciousness are not "saved." If it seeks to reduce the alien it suffers the _cor curvum in se_ and fails to account for the fact that the alien appeared alien. And if it seeks to account for both in a way which gives some self-confidence to natural consciousness yet does not preclude the possibility of being defined from without, then it renounces the right to a closed system. This last is the alternative Bonhoeffer chooses, and in his terms it means that philosophy must account for Heidegger's "man himself concretely putting the question of being," and in a way which does not incur a _cor curvum in se_.[25] That is to say, it must give to a question arising in and through temporality an answer that does not negate temporality; it may of course invoke eternality, say in the manner of Heidegger's ontologizing, but only if it can do this without dismembering the temporal. Again the preferred alternative must honor the temporal as the source of the question and must recognize that just as a temporally proffered resolution puts the inquiry on a new plane, so further (future) encounters may again transform the plane of operations. Hence an acceptable "system" would have to be a system which refuses to close itself, a system which guards its own availability to future definitive encounter. Such a system must in other words maintain its openness to further "revelation." But insofar as both the transcendental and ontological theses

> evolve into the I-enclosed system (in that the I understands itself wholly from itself, can place itself into truth), they offer no assistance in understanding the idea of revelation. If on the one side the genuinely transcendental thesis admitted a being transcendent of consciousness, a being "with reference" to which existence was envisaged, but a being which itself remained non-objective, and if on the other side genuine ontology considers being the a priori of thought in such a way that thought is itself suspended in being, it is an inescapable conclusion that in the first case the limits are prescribed by reason itself, that in the second case being somehow falls into the power of the thinking I, consequently that in both cases the I understands itself from itself within a closed system. *Per se*, a philosophy cannot spare room for revelation; let it then recognize revelation and confess itself Christian philosophy, knowing that the place it wished to usurp *is already* occupied by another--Christ.[26]

Two terms which have not yet been discussed are of significance here. The first is "confess"; philosophy which recognizes that its limits are temporally revealed may not dogmatically assert or posit its limits, for to declare them fails to acknowledge that they are potentially subject to further modification, while to posit them fails to honor their external origin. Hence it confesses them. The second term is "Christ." "Christ" is the collective name for the limits under consideration here. In discussing the nature of reason, Bonhoeffer says, ". . . essentially reason has no bounds. . . . There are bounds only to concrete man as a whole, and their name is Christ."[27] The choice of "Christ" as a technical term here is to be justified in terms of Bonhoeffer's "world-come-of-age" thesis which in many ways continues the demythologizing more rightly associated with Bultmann. It is of only peripheral interest here.

Of more thematic interest is the character of revelation as contingent. It and the belief which depends upon it occur to one as events. They are not to be found as possible elements of an omnipotent reason engaging in its own thematic Auslegung nor among the existential-ontological possibilities of the Heideggerian catalogue, but only among the actual events of concrete man. But surely, traditional philosophy must respond, existence without revelation and existence after revelation are both existence. And as such the philosophical methods applicable to the former are applicable to the latter.

To be sure Bonhoeffer would not want to put any ontological categories between these two modes of existence, i.e., either as barriers or as the source of the distinction. But just as for Heideggerian philosophy only authentic existence is able to distinguish itself from inauthentic existence, and not vice-versa, and as for Hegelian philosophy only Spirit is able to distinguish itself from understanding, and not vice-versa; so for Bonhoeffer only the man who has experienced the contingent event(s) called revelation is able to articulate the effect it has. The breakdown of this comparison occurs however when we seek, as philosophy rightly insists we must, the source of this new mode of being, for in Hegel and in Heidegger it is man himself who lifts himself to this new level. For Bonhoeffer the source genuinely transcends man.

It is just at this point that we see "philosophy's" claim really answered, although it is revelation which must answer it. Philosophy proclaimed the identity of existence before and after revelation. Only revelation however can really substantiate such a claim.

> In the existential event of revelation, the existential structure of existence is attacked and transmuted. . . . Inasmuch as it consistently observes man without regard to the event of revelation, the phenomenological definition of existence according to its existential structure

> as "historical," as "care," as "being unto death," is, for revelation, no less an abstraction and hypothesis than a merely biological definition of man.[28]

Thus, though thought is a system, aiming at completeness, universality, and absoluteness, if this system seeks to close itself, it either shuts its evidence in, rendering itself and its evidence indistinguishable; or it shuts its evidence out, rendering itself and its evidence incommunicable. In the former case it loses its soul; in the latter, its world.

The systematic reference required to prevent the self-enclosure or self-loss of thought is reference to an inviolable or transcendent otherness. But the experience of this otherness must be an event, not a disrobing of an ontic or ontological structure of the self. These latter can be appropriated by thought, i.e., their otherness is easily compromised or overcome. Only a contingent event, one whose occurrence cannot be seen as a necessary development of self-contained thought, has the required characteristic of transcendent otherness.

The accounting for this contingent event in the lives of individuals might be said to lead one to speak of God, although of course the necessity for it stems from the facts that thought seeks reasons and that thought seeks to appropriate. The former, that thought seeks reasons, is an ontological-existential structure of man; the latter, that thought seeks to appropriate, is an ontic-existential structure of man, i.e., as sinful. Here indeed "the ontic-existential and the ontological-existential structures coincide."[29] The accounting for the contingent event stems from the fact that thought must account in a way which does not betray the very notion of accounting. It must account for the event; that is, it must perform some sort of mediation. Yet it must not reduce the event, i.e., it must accept the event, as contingent, as on a different level from its own structures and hence not to be confused with them, Hegel notwithstanding. Insofar as giving an account of an event refers to locating its source, one might be led to speak of God, at least as personal, for the event grants a certain guarantee of the possibility of freedom from self-imprisonment, and as such may be considered the granting of the new person in Christ, i.e., the granting of the knowledge of the true limits of thought, limits which ontologically "pre-existed" knowledge of them and served to obstruct knowledge, but whose rendering conscious serves to assist knowledge. This granting of personal freedom might be said to indicate the personal and free nature of God, for _non dat quod non habet_. But this can only be considered metaphorical, only, that is, without performing the grossest anthropomorphisms.

In the availability of thought to the modifications of its conditions, we have the first step in the development of what shall be called the nature of man as historical.

But before any thesis on man's historicity can be formulated, there are certain other features of this theory which must be developed from Bonhoeffer. These concern the more positive program of the remainder of Act and Being. The act-being problem has led into a discussion of revelation. If revelation cannot in turn generate a treatment of the act-being problem, all that has been warranted is a kind of agnosticism: we have shown the limitations of modern philosophy negatively or critically, but no positive remarks have been justified. Bonhoeffer discusses this problem in Act and Being in the chapters, "Revelation in Terms of the Act" and "Revelation in Terms of Being."

We have noted Bonhoeffer's criticisms of Kant and Hegel, and we have suggested the demands which must be made on any system if it is to avoid these same criticisms. Yet the fundamental source of the difficulties we have not yet discovered. It will be the function of chapter two to discuss how act and being assert themselves as exhaustive alternatives and to what extent we must acknowledge them to be so.

CHAPTER TWO

BONHOEFFER'S RESOLUTION AND THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE FUTURE

Explanations in terms of act and in terms of being have brought us to the same alternative: either suffer the _cor curvum in se_ or admit revelation as the contact with reality. For philosophy the choice must be clear in consideration of the automatic falsehood involved with the first alternative, namely that it claims an access to reality which it cannot justify. Yet neither account has adequately handled revelation. Indeed it would seem that such an account has been rendered impossible. The task of this chapter will be to show the relation of these accounts to the major issue of this dissertation. In accordance with this project the relationship of the self to act and being will be described and a beginning of the characterization of Dasein as historical will be made.

First we shall discuss the senses in which act-accounts and being-accounts require each other. We shall discuss this problem first as a problem of resolving act and being. And we shall see that this is also the Being-Becoming problem. We shall seek a resolution by finding an alternative to the standard formulations of this problem, a resolution whose major category will be "the future as consummation."

The first account, the account of revelation in terms of act, gives full rein to contingency, and contingency, as Bonhoeffer has repeatedly remarked, is crucial to revelation. Yet there are several disadvantages to regarding revelation strictly in terms of act. One is that the claims of speculative thought are largely ignored or even rejected. Act *qua* act can offer no material for reflection. Hence any account of revelation as act winds itself into a tight knot: God is in the act; no claim for God's existence outside the act can be made; but God grants faith in God; hence it is not I who believe, but God. If we thought Hegelianism failed to account for Bonhoeffer's "concrete psychophysical man," we surely cannot admit this position, first because the central act, faith, fails to involve concrete man; and second because no means has been provided for accounting for the continuity or identity of either God or the I; they exist only in confrontation. Hence from what ontological corner they propel themselves in order to become present to one another remains a mystery. Clearly what is called for here is an ontological account if any permanence is to be attributed to the participants; i.e., what is required is an account in terms of being.

The account for revelation in terms of being begins by noticing the traditional methods of handling this problem.

They are three. The first is doctrine, which Bonhoeffer quickly rejects because it objectifies encounter into tokens which cannot be preserved except as a "gift" of voluntarily resigning consciousness to itself. The second, psychic experience, collapses into the former alternative, act. The third is institution. Here Bonhoeffer specifically rejects both the Roman Catholic notion of the Church and the Protestant notion of the verbal inspiration of Scripture as models of "institutions." "The being of an institution is incapable of affecting the existence of man *qua* sin" i.e., *qua* the intrinsic acquisitiveness of act.[30] These notions fail to be adequate to revelation because, in the Protestant case, their objectivizing of God renders God identical to the I, and because, in the Catholic case, the accessibility of the claims of catholicity--apostolic succession, etc.--presents epistemologically unverifiable claims. The enterprise then in order to complete itself must resort to an epistemology in terms of act.

We are left then with three alternatives. The first attempts to account for revelation solely in terms of act and cannot account for the permanence or logical self-identity of the agents, namely the self and God. This is the theological counterpart to Kantian transcendentalism. The second attempts to account for revelation in terms of doctrine and cannot save itself from the *cor curvum in se*, i.e., from subjectivism. This is the theological counterpart to Hegelian idealism. The third attempts to account for revelation in terms of institution and, like Heideggerian ontology, fails to generate an epistemology adequate to its metaphysical or ontological claims.

It becomes clear at this point that new categories are needed if philosophy is not to be judged either subjective, as in the case of an act account, and hence not a science; or epistemologically unsound, as in the case of a being account, and hence unable to produce evidence adequate to its claims. It would seem that there is a third alternative, namely phenomenology, but phenomenology regards revelation, as everything else, as "there for the finding" yet never bothers to account for the "there." As we have earlier remarked, Husserl brackets the question of reality,--something we are not willing to do.

How then are we to account for revelation? The categories Bonhoeffer suggests are "theo-sociological," their special relevance being their extrinsicality.[31] That is to say, he will attempt to account for revelation in terms of the Church, here in a special sense, as must be recognized, for the standard Catholic and Protestant ecclesiologies have already been eliminated. But what could this special sense be: It would seem that for any account whatever, the methodological alternatives have been exhausted. Neither act nor being can account for revelation. That means neither act-subject terms nor ontological terms. What leads

Bonhoeffer to think there is a basis left for systematic thought? It is the contention of this dissertation that there yet remains a third alternative, and that the alternative is not intrinsically theological, even though Bonhoeffer's development of this alternative is theological in direction. In order to demonstrate the nature of this alternative, it is necessary to restate our present quandary in more thematic terms, i.e., as a problem in philosophical method rather than as an eccleciastical problem.

Among the common ways in which metaphysical systems are classified, one of the most frequent is division into systems of Being and systems of Becoming. In the epistemological framework we have outlined, the distinction can be described as follows. When thought regards its evidence as contemporaneous with it, at its disposal, awaiting its categorizing, we have a system of Being. When thought allows its evidence to be dispersed throughout time, honoring the experience of their impermanence, we have a system of Becoming.

The epistemological derivatives of philosophies of Being and Becoming are epistemologies of being and act, respectively. But the philosophy of act, the epistemological derivative of the philosophy of Becoming, collapses without ontological categories, thereby summoning once more the philosophy of Being, which cannot save appearances.

This philosophical problem, that a system of Being and one of Becoming seem each to need the other in order to account for the fact that human experience contains both flux and stability, and to repel each other for the same reason, turns on the view systematic thought takes of its evidence: Its evidence is either fully present of itself, and history is expendable, or it is fully present on the basis of the past, i.e., to its present is attributed a fullness its past cannot warrant--and history is absolute.

A philosophical synthesis of these, such as Hegel's, takes its evidence to be a gift of Spirit to itself given out of its own past according to the necessities established by that past. The basis which we wish to provide for thought is one which owes much to Bonhoeffer's notion of revelation as contingent event:

> In the concept of contingency as happening which is coming to us from outside, the present is determined by the future; in the system, inasmuch as the (in principle) "beforeness" of the rational background obtains, the present is determined by the past.[32]

What we are claiming here then is that, so long as systems of Being and Becoming are viewed as exhaustive alternatives, i.e., so long as epistemologies of act and of being are regarded as the only possibilities, philosophy must acknowledge the correctness of Bonhoeffer's criticisms. But Bonhoeffer's resolution is theological. How intrinsic to the resolution is that fact that it is presented as theological?

The position taken here is that Bonhoeffer's solution is not intrinsically theological, for transcendentalism and ontology incurred the difficulties outlined not because they failed to be theological, but because they failed properly to assess what it means for evidence to be "present." And to be confined to systems of Being and Becoming is to incur these difficulties of necessity. The difficulty is this: these systems regard the present as explicable in terms of the past or merely in its own terms. Bonhoeffer discards the view that the present is foregone in its structures and merely a variation on a prescribed theme. This dissertation will argue that the future is a necessary factor in the determining of the present.

I shall be speaking then of a particular fashion in which the future is to be regarded as a necessary factor in determining the present. To be slightly more specific, I shall be speaking of the future as the consummation of the present. Hence any account of the present must be in terms of its consummate essence, which awaits future manifestation. The future as consummation then will be discussed in Bonhoeffer's terms. The order of procedure then will be as follows. First Bonhoeffer's ecclesiology will be outlined in order to complete his model, even though, strictly speaking, this leads us somewhat outside our chosen domain. Then we shall deal with the future as consummation in terms of the theses of this dissertation.

To return to Bonhoeffer's model--in Bonhoeffer's terms, revelation "is" within the Church. That is where the limits of man are disclosed to him as personal, are challenged, and are restored to him by the community. It is within the community that Dasein comes to understand itself as under the power of a *cor curvum in se*, and hence not in the truth. It is here also that the *cor curvum in se* is encountered radically by another which exists in that mode which alone can truly encounter Dasein in transcendental otherness, namely in the personal mode. Here *Dasein* is truly encountered, whether one means encountered by other persons in a relationship of mutual understanding, love, and forgiveness, or encountered by an other whose freedom *Dasein* cannot ignore. In either case what is established is a community of love wherein one can with other persons explore his existence without the (selfish and prideful) need for dissimilation and self-protection which the *cor curvum in se* imposes. This is Christ existing as community then. Descriptively speaking, man always finds himself in some sort of community, but "Christ is the corporate person of the Christian communion" (i.e., community). What has gone before, by way of presenting the epistemology of transcendentalism and ontology has had an individualistic orientation. This is no longer defensible. The potential of the community in making such major modifications as the release from the power of the *cor curvum in se* cannot be ignored.

Thus some sort of sociological category must be introduced. This plus the previous establishing of "the future" in its fullness of scope lead to the reformulation of the problem of act and being.

The (mode of) being of revelation, Bonhoeffer maintains, is identical to the (mode of) being of the community of persons. Revelation is not a past event, at one's disposal, nor is it merely an act which occasionally interrupts one's life. That is to say it is neither solely being nor solely act. It has the potential to place one into truth; hence to suspend the _cor_ _curvum_ _in_ _se_, the old man, the inauthentic, in behalf of the new existence. Yet as the introduction of a sociological category would indicate, it is not strictly reducible either to terms of act (continuity being assured by the community) or to terms of being (its being at one's disposal by being past having been replaced by its present availability to encounter, this past having been raised to presence by the hope of the community for the consummation of its faith in the future).

What we have done thus far then is to note the embarrassment from Bonhoeffer's viewpoint of philosophy's inability to deal with or treat of the "concrete, psychophysical man." We have disclosed the sources of this inability as residing in the orientation of the thinker to the past and in his individualistic self-concern. And we have noted the steps Bonhoeffer takes to correct this situation, namely in suspending the stiflingly exclusive concern for the self and its manipulable (past) entities, i.e., in overcoming "ontic narcissism." Yet this is not without problems for philosophy,--problems which Bonhoeffer may be able to ignore, yet which we cannot--for the ability to get outside oneself, the freedom from exclusive self-concern, is to be recognized as a gift, or at least as fortuitous and contingent: if the language of "gift" is maintained, sooner or later one must ask about the giver. If the language of fortuity is maintained, sooner or later one must ask about the role of necessity.

How then could one recommend this position to another person, when this position is a gift, or how can one set about describing an itinerarium mentis if the positioning of the person into this new existence is a fortuity? To admit these questions is to incur all the previous problems of act and being, man's action vs. his passion, etc., by replacing a dynamic dialectic in time with mere chronology. It further suggests that undergoing a revelation is something one decides to do.

As opposed to these suggestions we must note that the individual believer does not merely take past data, evidence at his disposal, and structure his present as it occurs. Rather he bases his reading of the present on a future hope, agreeing with Marx that it is the presupposition that history is intelligible in itself which represents the crassest and most dangerous materialism. The act of belief then is not an act which occurs at a certain point along a time-line, in which the direction of the believer's intentionality is turned 180° from past to future. Rather belief discloses that this new orientation already is available to anyone who is willing to accept its discipline and enjoy its freedom, indeed that *it is the presupposition of genuine self-understanding*. In Bonhoeffer's terms, faith discovers itself already existing within the fellowship of the faithful; faith discovers itself not creating or conditioning this new being, but created and conditioned by it.[33] In a terminology we have not yet fully developed, one finds one's existence in community to be either an existence in Adam or in Christ. When one comes to belong within the latter one recognizes that one was already in the latter before one recognized it. This is a logical result of the fact that in the "initial" encounter, the *cor curvum in se* (being-in-Adam) was unable to assume the initiative.

Is man's existence then to be considered act or being? To be sure, neither alternative is simply correct.

> In accordance with the being of revelation the being of man should be conceived neither frozen as entity nor spirited into non-entity. In either of these cases the total existence of man would, in the end, stay unaffected. No; the man we must consider is the historical man who knows himself transplanted from the old into the new humanity. . . . The person, as a synthesis of act and being is always two in one: *individual* and *humanity*. The concept of the absolute individual is an abstraction with no corresponding reality. It is not merely in his

> general psychology but in his very existentiality that man is tied to society. When his existence is touched (in judgment and mercy), he knows that he is being directed toward humanity. He has himself committed the sin of the old humanity, yet he knows at the same time that humanity drew him into its sin and guilt when he was powerless to resist. He is the bearer of the new humanity in his faith, prayer, and affirmation, yet knows that he is borne in all his actions by the communion, by Christ. Man as individual and man as humanity, man one in two inseparable aspects, is but another way of saying man as act and being.[34]

This accomplishes several things. First, in the fact that 'The unity of the I "is" "only in faith"' the Heideggerian fear of the quotidian or "everydayness" is overcome, for everydayness constitutes no special threat to the new man, whereas it does to Heidegger's authentic Dasein. Secondly and more importantly it legitimatizes a previous argument. When one speaks of the limits of reason and of the concrete human being, the danger of subjectivism arises, namely the danger that one may not be speaking of limits inherent in humanity, but only of one's own private limitations. This danger threatens every philosophical enterprise such as Aristotle's or Augustine's, which undertakes a metaphysics, an epistemology, a psychology, or an ethics on the basis that e.g., "All men by nature desire to know." "All men desire the good." or "Man's heart is restless until it finds its rest in Thee." The ability to speak of humanity out of individual experience is furthermore the basis of the utilitarian's faith that selfishness will not destroy the societies of the utopian socialists; and of course it is the basis for all hope of universal community.

The issue involved here would seem to become a problem for Bonhoeffer, except that the new being in Christ knows, as Hölderlin says, that we are become a conversation. In the interaction within the community one attempts to learn what limits are intrinsic human limits and which are private limitations. The community thus mediates one's individuality and one's humanity. Hence the importance of confession within the community. But this project can never be wholly completed until societal boundaries are surpassed, otherwise the "universal limits" the community discovers are merely "national characteristics." Hence the completion of this knowledge awaits the universalizing of the community. Here again the dynamic role of "the future" comes to the fore as that out of which the present is to be lived.

Just as the character of act is modified, insofar as the act of faith is constitutive of the new being under the sociological category, so also the character of being is modified by the sociological category, in particular the character of being as it refers to persons. The mode of being typically attributed to entities, "there is," is not applicable to persons:

> "There is" no believer, no sinner; "there is" no "given" human existence, *qua* encountered, but it "is" . . . in the execution of acts within the Church--in which same acts the unity of the existence is affirmed.[35]

As well, 'There is no God that "there is."' (*Ein Gott den es gibt, gibt es nicht.*) The "ontological categories," then, the levels of being which are of greatest (epistemological) significance, are levels of man's being. This is not surprising considering Bonhoeffer's earlier remark that the meaning of epistemology is anthropology. Like most philosophical positions, this one requires a special modification of natural consciousness, in this case "faith," in order to render the described realities accessible. And like most anthropologies, "lower" modes of being-human can be distinguished from the higher only *by* the higher, only from the higher viewpoint, and not from the lower.

Unlike descriptive phenomenology, Bonhoeffer's position is not committed to the equal value of all appearances: whereas Heidegger has to protest that "authentic" and "inauthentic" do not constitute value judgments, Bonhoeffer clearly claims that a life touched by genuine encounter with a transcendent other subject is more desirable, more valuable, than the alternative; and that furthermore such is only possible within the community. To say that there is no God that "there is" or that there is no I that "there is" is to say that the categories expressed by "there is" and so extensively used by phenomenology are not adequate to the study of Dasein's being-in-the-world. As we have seen Dasein's being is historical. It is an historical participation in encounter. It is a participation in encounter which is truly constitutive. Hence Dasein's participation cannot be said merely to uncover ontological categories, but to "create" them by participation. Neither does it merely actualize by participation a select "pre-given" set which was originally there for Dasein, but only "potentially." No; encounter is much more significant than this. There is no set of categories to be actualized or uncovered of which it can be said that "there is." There is no absolute personal identity of which can be said "there is." There simply is no God who simply is. But then in what sense can existence be affirmed? This question becomes the special concern of the final part of Act and Being.

The final part of Act and Being, 'The Act-Being Problem in the Concrete Doctrine of Man "in Adam" or "in Christ,"' is of interest not only for its finally rendering fully concrete the results of our philosophizing thus far, but as well for its implicit relating of itself to various other philosophies. The references to other positions, especially through repeated use of Heidegger's terminology, helps us to understand more thoroughly what Bonhoeffer means by "concrete" in his phrase "concrete, psychophysical man." But in addition to implicit references to other philosophical traditions, it might be explicitly remarked that although Bonhoeffer does not himself say so, the whole Cartesian project of making man the "master and possessor of nature" is what is at stake here; and that as Bonhoeffer has outlined the alternatives, both Hegelian idealism and Heideggerian ontology proceed to the conclusion that since it is man's mind which calls the world into doubt (cathartic or otherwise), it is the same mind which must certify the world's credibility. The upshot of this usurpation is Kierkegaardian *Angst* which culminates the process of doubt by adding self-doubt.[36] This overcoming of the distinction between theory (which doubts all) and practice (which affords the self some special protection)--a distinction specifically provided for by Descartes--is of course made possible by Hegel. What is challenged here then is nothing less than the entire modern tradition insofar as its model for knowledge is mastery and possession.

Bonhoeffer begins his treatment of *Dasein's* alternatives by discussing the lesser of two possible positions, positions however which are themselves taken to be exhaustive alternatives. "*Sola fide credendum est nos esse peccatores*," Bonhoeffer begins:

> If it were humanly possible to know oneself a sinner without revelation, neither "being in Adam" nor "being in Christ" would be an existential definition of man's being, for it would mean that a man could place himself into truth and could therefore turn back from his being *qua* sinner to some more fundamental being of his own. . . ."[37]

"Being in Adam" of course is being under the power of the *cor curvum in se*; taken to its consummation, it is the completion of the self's acquisitiveness. Yet such a consummation is despair, as we have seen, for all limits have been surpassed, hence all determinations, and the self loses its identity thereby. And so finally (for philosophy this occurs in Heidegger), acknowledging its rapacity and undertaking its own judgment, Dasein submits to conscience and resumes its being-towards-death. But even here its efforts fail, for the self is still asserting its "absolute rights" in presuming to be its own judge. Even here the self is without safety, for the limits it has transgressed it is not of itself adequate to restoring, even as a judgment--in the mythic speech of theology, it cannot of itself resurrect the Christ it has crucified. Yet without the restoration of these limits, it has no nature (being) and no role (act), for every negation (limit) is a determination. Only in the restoration of these limits is the self's nature as act and being restored to the self.

Yet as we have seen, these limits cannot be restored in an experience of mathematical or scientific discovery or in an aesthetic experience, for these either are (in the former cases) or can be made (in the last) cases of mastery. The experience of revelation however is one of humiliation from which one recovers in gratitude. This is the restoration of thought to its limits which is at once a negation and a determination, and thenceforward thought

> "is" not in the fixed entity-mode of "there is," but in the very movement of being in faith. Ontologically this means that God is at once the basis of the creature's being and its master. Transcendentally it means that the existence of the creature is "amid and with reference to" transcendence.[38]

This resolution and restoration is not without cost for thought, even though the ontological and transcendental expressions have been given their due, for

> No metaphysical deductions or distinctions--*existentia*, *essentia*, *ens*--no ontological-existential structures are capable of hunting down the "*Da*" of creaturehood.[39]

This "*Da*" exists only in the comportment toward revelation, i.e., in openness toward the future. It is not the mere "*da*" of phenomenology, locating intended objects and their logical structures on a planar world. It belongs instead to a world of depth, a world with a history. As we have remarked before, the error of self-enclosing systematic thought is that it misreads its evidence. It sees the presence of its objects in the light of their past or present alone. This error must now be corrected.

This dissertation submits that the "*da*" of Dasein is not to be regarded as simple thereness, simple presentedness, nor simple presence-to-the-world. *Dasein's* orientation to the world is not analogous to the compresence of contiguous objects to one another. And the reason compresence provides no worthy analogue is that the presence involved in "the compresence of contiguous objects" poses as fulfilled presence. Such objects are abstractly considered to be the culmination of their separate histories, complete and having outdistanced or at least consummated their pasts. Dasein however can never be so described. Dasein's "*da*" is the "*da*" of anticipation. Dasein's career of appropriation has been abandoned--not altogether voluntarily to be sure--but abandoned nonetheless. So there can be no question of gathering up Dasein's past and hurling it toward the future (Heidegger), for that is to seize with renewed vigor what Dasein has already seen to be an unbearable and unworthy burden. Rather Dasein's eye is fixed on the future with a far more intent gaze than ever Heidegger could propose, for what occurs there is not the march of Heideggerian Being or the "bloodless war of categories." What occurs there has already gripped Dasein more firmly than could the spectacle of Being and involved him more profoundly than could the "slaughterhouse of individuals and nations." What encounters and restores Dasein brings a renewal so thorough that Dasein regards it as precedental. Thereby it reorients one's whole life.

Occurrences of the revelation of one's nature so clearly initiate new existence that the phenomenon becomes central in one's life. It is for this reason that we wish to maintain the irreducibility of this phenomenon in any philosophical system. One's identity, which had been squandered, is restored through faith, and only through faith. The attendance on the consummation of this faith is the new being of Dasein. Unlike Absolute Spirit, Dasein has a future. Unlike Heideggerian authenticity, Dasein participates in this future.

Faith participates in its future by anticipation. But what is there to anticipate? If its rescue from the *cor curvum in se* has been accomplished, what more awaits it? In a sense nothing more awaits the private enjoyment of Dasein, for Dasein's joy is no longer a private affair. Its hopeful anticipation is not simply the awaiting the fulfillment of private ambitions. Rather it is for the community of persons among whom Dasein finds himself that he hopes--for their participation with him in a decisively different community, one informed and transformed by revelation. This of course in Bonhoeffer's view is the Christian Church. In theological terms, Dasein anticipates the perpetuation and victory of the Church on earth. In this victory he already participates--just as he participates in his own identity--by faith. But here we see that anticipation is inherent in faith, for faith is the belief in the perpetual possibility of renewal and the willingness to receive it. Hence for thought to overcome the systematic narcissism of the *cor curvum in se* it must turn its attention in responsive anticipation to a future which it beholds and owns by faith.

In sum Dasein can only account for the presence of evidence in terms of its historicity. Yet for self-consciousness, the self is part of its own evidence. Hence the presence of Dasein must be understood in terms of historicity. But the historicity of Dasein is its availability to renewal. The availability to renewal includes the expectation of renewal; hence an orientation to the future. Yet the coming-to-expect-renewal is itself a form of renewal; does this not impose a reorientation which interrupts the continuity of Dasein? We have found that this question is one which arises only previous to renewal, only before revelation; after renewal Dasein discovers what was true all along but what he could hardly believe before, namely that his true existence is and always was in the future. Furthermore the future orientation does not necessarily forget the past in respect of the identity of believing Dasein, even though, as Bonhoeffer says, "In his determination by the future, man is wholly detached from himself by contemplation of Christ."[40] This is of course tautological, but from the argument which led to it we can conclude at last, with Bonhoeffer, "It is only out of the future that the present can be lived."[41]

Such a conclusion naturally accords well with the text as examined. It is the only acceptable conclusion to our discussion of the act-being problem, and it alone offers any help for the problem of Being and Becoming. It of course acknowledges the role we have assigned to anticipation. It offers a *modus vivendi* for *Dasein* living under the *cor curvum in se*. And it accounts for the being of *Dasein* as social and as personal. Yet what of the discussion of *Dasein* as historical. It would seem that our conclusion, that "It is only out of the future that the present can be lived," is only tenuously related to the discipline of history. It would seem that the historian bases the living of the present on being conversant with the past, and that the future is a superfluous hypothesis here. The exploration of this apparent discrepancy will be the next and major project of this dissertation.

CHAPTER THREE

THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE FUTURE AND HISTORY

We have seen that the only way to salvage thought from the cor curvum in se is to deliver reason over to historicity--not to be sure to the Hegelian parody of history, the "marshalling of Aristotelian types"; nor to the Heideggerian plea for man's non-interference in the temporality of Being--but to history which does not pretend to be fulfilled, history which yet has a future.

We have seen as well that historicity is to be dealt with in concrete terms, the terms of the "concrete, psychophysical man" living in the historical community, who is touched--if by God, not by a metaphysical cipher, if by men, not by abstract individuals--in ways which are decisive and definitive and which he is unable to provide himself. The loss of the self without this other's coming to him in the personal mode, and the reaffirmation of this self by others eager to involve this self in community, come to Dasein, as we have said, as humiliation from which he recovers in gratitude. For these conclusions Bonhoeffer's assistance has been explicit--and invaluable. But Bonhoeffer's remarks on history are casual and undeveloped. For what follows then we shall be forced to forego his remarkable assistance.

That history has a future seems not to be a significant claim unless it is recognized in what a strong sense it is meant. We might even say that the future has history. We shall presently undertake a discussion of various modes of the recording of history, in other words of the discipline, History.[42] But before undertaking such a project, we must outline the criteria which shall be regarded as necessary in order that any particular record be regarded as History.

That someone would write History of course assumes a certain interest in history. The interest in history involved in this inquiry is a real interest in the concerns of men--an interest which far outdistances idle curiosity. This interest in men of all ages and cultures is an interest in men who took themselves seriously, and our willingness to take them seriously reflects our acknowledgement of the seriousness of their endeavors, although not necessarily an equal respect for their solutions. In other words the attempt at History is genuine, although not necessarily successful, when it attempts to understand "major" human activities. A "major" human activity is one which sheds light on what it means to be human. This of course is less a definition than an admission of the impossibility of the success of this sort of definition. Such a definition as is required must develop as we progress, especially in the light of the conclusion of the previous chapter that the discovery of what it means to be human (in other words of the nature of thought) is a project to be performed by humanity, as a community of those dedicated to this task.

The project then of reading the significance of the past awaits the future fulfillment of that past. In other words, endowing that past with any single meaning requires the expectation of the future to fulfill and confirm that meaning. Of course the project of History furthers this confirmation by rendering alternatives explicit for the community's acceptance or rejection. But here there is no Paraclete. There is no guarantee that communities will not be misled. There is no guarantee that the future will confirm this or that special reading of what constitutes human thought. There is no guarantee that the future will even regard the universalizing of human community as a worthy project. Furthermore here we must speak of the community as an idea and no longer in empirical terms. Here our only "guarantee" is that the failure to acknowledge the possibility of definitive encounter out of the future is self-stultifying--that, and the admittedly non-demonstrable recognition that the formulating of our expectations has increased our participation.

We seem then to have come upon the drama too late to have heard the announced program and will not stay around long enough to see its end. This is in accordance with the character of thought as act. Yet unless we wish to testify that the drama is itself not valuable we must not allow it to dissolve; and we are not capable of resolving it. This is in accordance with the nature of thought as being. Hence our role is ambiguous. We must simply carry on. As Garcin says in Sartre's _No Exit_, "_Continuons_."[43] But the advice makes no sense unless we have some idea what it is we are to continue. Garcin has the project of sustaining the situation of mutual suspicion and contempt to which he is damned. This is a project given to him, not chosen. Ours too is of course a project given to us, by contingency of birth, not chosen. But we do not bring the implicit understanding to our task that Garcin does. And unlike Garcin, we do not have eternity for discovering the _modus vivendi_. Indeed we are not even convinced that it is a _project_, unless we discover that it is not intelligible of itself, i.e., not absolute, not to be understood in eternal terms, hence to be understood if at all as a temporal project. Hence a certain urgency--which encourages the project to be sure, but as well robs it of the opportunity to gather the evidence which would satisfy it. And hence of course faith, a self-projection (Heidegger) to be sure, but only a tentative one which must work to accomplish the very goals it relies upon and which must always have an anticipated future to live from.

Our results thus far then are modest. Man's present "exists," "Is," "is fulfilled" only in the future. But then of course the past as well is fulfilled in the future, for we have already denied the possibility of cutting off the present from the past. What shall follow then will be a discussion of the various ways men have directed their pasts toward a future. This will be done in terms of the recording of history, for History has the peculiar merit, that, as against mathematics and the experimental sciences, the character of objectivity (thought as being) is not allowed to dominate, for a historian who cannot involve himself in his project cannot understand the motivation of its characters; and as against literature and the arts, the character of subjectivity (thought as act) is not allowed to dominate, for then History becomes propaganda or fiction. With this in mind, that History should take as its goal neither complete objectivity nor complete subjectivity, with this in mind not as a presupposition but as a project as yet too indistinct to be a proposition, we shall begin.

We have discovered that man's "self-sufficient finitude" (the phrase is Tillich's) is inadequate to read the "objective" truth of history, for such a project compromises thought as act; hence some sort of faith is necessary. But we are unable to foist our subjective whim on history; hence not just any faith will do. Where then shall we get the clues for dealing with history?

The first hope is that an epistemology will emerge out of revelation which gives access to a set of criteria which will direct the investigation. Here perhaps an example should be given of revelation. For example, in conversation a friend declares to me that my stand on a current issue is irresolute. This comes as a surprise to me.[44] I had regarded my position as, say, liberal, or enlightened, or sophisticated. But I reflect on my position and find that he is after all correct: I have been remiss in my devotion to, say, justice. Here then is a limit to reason which I had not recognized, which perhaps my formulations of the issue had prevented my recognizing, which comes to me in an experience of humiliation (I am found out.) from which I recover in gratitude (I am glad to be set straight, to be delivered, in a small way perhaps, from the death in the midst of life.). Thus far then the example fits the description of previous chapters completely. But when subjected to rigorous scrutiny the "limit" to my reason which is revealed to me is found to be particular and not at all intrinsic, even though it may represent a fairly common failing. The limit then does not resist systematic scrutiny. I can even set about circumventing this limitation, reflect intently, and screw up my courage; resolve may win out over my former position, and the "limit" is seen not to have been universal.

This is not always possible even in community. Occasionally a limit arises which one cannot overcome. The most common examples of limits cited in modern philosophy to substantiate the more general claim being made here, the claim that mind as we know it is decidedly not fully self-possessed, are fear, Angst, dread, despair, suspicion, etc. These experiences reveal to man his limited agency: one is not responsible for one's being in the world, for one did not choose it; but one is responsible for one's actions in the world, even if the sense of that responsibility is ambiguous. In other words, one is not responsible for the fact that one must act responsibly.

The ambiguity of that responsibility is notorious. It involves all the questions of free will and determinism, responsibility for the results of one's actions which one did not will and may even have tried to prevent, responsibility for injury done in choosing the lesser of two evils, responsibility for indirect or unforeseen results of one's actions, etc. And the ambiguity of our own situation contributes a major body of evidence to the thesis that the reading of history is ambiguous, for the intentions of others are generally not known to us, except in autobiographies, and even those are not fully trustworthy--the Straussian or esoteric view of literary criticism is just as much a red herring as the Straussian view of philosophy.

There is in history the further ambiguity that the evidence frequently does not speak for itself: Is Ivan the Terrible's murder of his son deliberate, and evidence for his madness, or accidental, and cause? The selective suppression of evidence can satisfy either claim. But what is meant here by ambiguity, namely the denial of the full intelligibility of history, involves far more than the suppression of data. Rather it involves the recognition that there is no such thing as pure data: "evidence" is always "evidence for," namely for one hypothesis of another. As well it involves recognition of the nature of the relationship between knower and known. These two recognitions deserve some comment.

The first, as it stands, seems to beg the question. Does it not merely say that we must hypothesize because of lack of evidence? Sufficient hypothesizing then should eventually direct enough research to gather in all evidence, and all enigmas be solved. There are two replies to the charge of petitio principii here. The first is that not all data is available, for human intentions constitute a valuable set of data, and they cannot be retrieved. The second is that the charge misunderstands the nature of historical evidence. Data is data-for-an-hypothesis. For an alternative hypothesis the data may be altogether irrelevant: for Gibbon the fall of Rome is to be charged to the rise of Christianity. Hence demographic figures on the religion of the populaces of various provinces of the Empire are quite relevant. For Rostovtseff the fall of Rome was an economic matter. Here also demographic figures are quite relevant, but Gibbon's figures are certainly largely irrelevant. Here rival attempts to comprehend the same phenomenon both call on demography, but the evidence on which the former rests is not even evidence for the latter, neither strengthening nor weakening its conclusions. If it is merely argued that the truth lies somewhere between and that a hypothesis large enough to collect all data would encounter no such obstacles, it must be replied that the point has been missed. Of course a hypothesis which would gather all evidence would encounter no obstacles. But that is precisely to invoke the absolute standpoint, and we have already renounced that as a possible or even worthy goal. It is, in one quite literal sense, a matter of gaining the whole world and losing one's soul. The point is that even by getting the most we can from all data, we still do not find the consummate essence of history, for we are looking in the wrong place, namely in the past instead of in the future. As to the second point, we have already seen that reason _per se_ has no limits. This means that reason _per se_ has no nature and therefore no standards, no automatic criteria for historical or any other kind of knowledge. Rather, as we have seen, only concrete men have limits, and in the present context this means that ambiguity is instituted as a permanent factor in our experiencing, only to be alleviated within the community which shares in the hope attendant on faith.

In sum there is no "there is" of facts until there has been established a past. But a past is always *our* past. But "our past" does not simply exist, does not exist at all without reference to a future, unless we claim that we now are fulfilled. This of course is impossible as it betrays the nature of thought as act. Thus in denying the intelligibility of history without faith, as in denying the intelligibility of Dasein without faith, we have denied that its essence is its existence. It is, in Bonhoeffer's terms, to deny the possibility of 'hunting down the "*Da*"' of history. And this impossibility stems as before from the fact that the essence of our intended object has not yet been manifested, and *that* because its essence has not yet been consummated. That is to say history is not yet over, not even essentially. There are things left to be done; more may yet be revealed to us. But certain things have been already revealed: history has a "*Da*" in the first place which cannot be "hunted down" because history is man's history (that is not to say at man's disposal) and not *Heilsgeschichte* or *Geistesgeschichte*.

But the reference to the future has not lost its double edge. If the future is correctly anticipated to fulfill a certain action of the present, that aspect of the present can be said to have prevailed. If however the future presents only the prospect of defeat, the future as anticipated cannot be said to have been properly conceived; i.e., the project the future thwarts is not thereby just or unjust, but it surely is a failure at self-understanding, for it failed properly to conceive its own consummate essence. That is to say, anticipation of the future is no gauge of success. Any particular project may anticipate for itself a consummation of its essence. It may, that is, project a future for itself. The mere fact of that projection, however, does not guarantee success. The project may fail. That failure offers no conclusion regarding the justice or injustice of the project. The strongest statement that can be made here is rather more epistemological, that the project has failed at self-understanding, for it has anticipated incorrectly its own consummation.

Examples might be given here. For one, Alexander the Great failed properly to recognize the limited nature of his attempt at world conquest, for he conquered the world yet did not satisfy his own desire for self-aggrandizement. It is said he wept for want of worlds to win. Likewise Xerxes found himself disappointed by his most brilliant displays of power. He is said to have wept bitterly just after numbering his armies, for he reflected that in but a century or less all would be dead, regardless of valor. Nor did the French Revolution anticipate the Reign of Terror.

The first two examples lack one feature which the last may seem to approximate, namely the reference to the community. Yet caution must be exercised here. Mere un-self-conscious public action does not approximate very closely to the idea of the genuine community.

Our project thus far in this chapter has been to discuss the criteria for regarding any particular record as History in an significant sense. We have seen that History requires a future reference, that History is tentative, and that History requires the participation of the community. We have seen that History requires faith, because there is no such thing as pure evidence or "facts." And we have seen that our own reference to revelation has not alleviated History's notorious ambiguity.

One wishes that more were possible. One wishes that this ambiguity were but temporary and not, as for our epistemology, permanently installed. What alternative have we for disclosing meaning in history? The only alternative which might restore some measure of confidence to the attribution of meaning to history is one which regards meaning in history not as a logical problem, but as an empirical one. Thus the approach left to us is one that is characteristically precedental. We have asked ourselves where we shall get the clues for dealing with history. The answer left to us is that we should seek them out from those great figures who have seized and shaped history to their own ends--not to ends tainted with despair or disappointment, as was the case for Alexander and Xerxes, but to successful ends. We shall turn then to the Louis XIV's and Frederick the Great's. Precedentalism shall be discussed in terms of both action and passion, both the individual and society.

It is not always the case that a hero's (or great man's) victories turn to ashes in his mouth: Alexander may not be unique, but neither is he paradigmatic. Nor is it always the case that his proposals and anticipations of the future reverse themselves to his chagrin: Midas too lacks universality. It has been maintained (e.g., by Carlyle and Froude) that the history of man is the history of the succession of men of heroic stature who have led their respective cultures out of obscurity or barbarity or both. This is most obvious in the ancient world where--and the example is fairly typical--awaiting a major dynasty, Egypt languishes in the Nile basin, while Israel flourishes under David and Solomon. Then, as less illustrious kings lead Israel, it succumbs to Assurbanipal's Assyria. Negatively, the lack of vigorous leaders has contributed to the decline of many an empire: the Ottoman's, the Seljuk's the Golden Horde, Rome, and Byzantium, just to mention a few. Although I do not wish to deny that there is frequently a strong (and not merely accidental) connection between illustrious rulers and illustrious ages, it can hardly be claimed on this account that the meaning of history is to be seen illustrated in its heroic figures whose self-confidence of their destinies allows them to cut through the ambiguity which plagues us lesser mortals. "Illustrious" and "meaningful" are hardly synonyms.

Furthermore it is surely not the great men themselves which interest us. Surely it is not merely their biographies we are after, but rather their impact. Napoleon's activities after 1815 fail to be of historical interest. His life until 1821, if mentioned at all by historians usually rates not more than a single sentence. The hero has not ceased to live, but he has ceased to be a hero. The difference of course is the exercise of power. Yet not just pure power is sought by the hero. Camus' Caligula wants the moon, just because it is something he cannot have. The hero then wants to exercise power, but power over real subjects. If no resistance is met, the hero has not "prevailed," he has merely acted. Omnipotence cannot be heroic. Napoleon ceases to exercise power, ceases even to entertain the possibility of exercising power, and he is dropped from the lists. Such phrases as "a power vacuum" and "the balance of power" reflect this general tendency to understand history in terms of the agencies of power it develops. Yet it must be admitted that if history has a meaning, the alternate ascendencies of hostile factions does not elucidate it.

We grow tired of the Niebelungenlied for precisely this reason. Sigbert, a chivalric hero of some stature, induced his brother to marry Galsunta, a sister of Sigbert's wife Brunhilde. But in order to marry this Christian, the brother, Chilperic, had to give up his polygamy. Fredegunda, one of Chilperic's abandoned wives, murdered the new wife and took her crown. Brunhilde called on her husband to avenge her sister. Sigbert defeated Chilperic, but was assassinated at his moment of triumph. Chilperic reasserted his power and imprisoned Brunhilde. Chilperic's son Merwig released Brunhilde and married her. The father defeated the son in battle and later put him to death. Chilperic was later assassinated and two sons by different wives went to war for the throne. One was killed and his place taken in the struggle by his mother. The mother defeated the other son, and he was soon poisoned. Soon the mother too died. Seizing the opportunity for power, Brunhilde stirred up rivalry between her two grandsons for the throne of the Frankish kingdoms. These two grandsons were brothers and one had the other killed. The crime was soon avenged and there arose four contenders for the throne, all four of them great-grandsons of Brunhilde. Clothar II, grandson of Fredegunda, killed Brunhilde and all four great-grandsons and established himself king, thereby effectively ending the family wars of the Merovingians.[45]

If this account seems unduly protracted, as I trust it does, it at least ends all doubt as to the meaninglessness of the exercise of power per se. As well it illustrates that history is not a matter of anonymous group action. But the hero, as our examples of Napoleon and Caligula illustrate, is only historically relevant so long as he exercises some sort of power, and ruthless manipulation of circumstance is simply no worthy definition of power. Meaning in history, whatever it might be, is not to be found here. Here meaning retreats as in Matthew Arnolds's extended "darkling plain" metaphor of "Dover Beach," for heroic action requires a broader basis than the exercise of power can provide in order to be a source of meaning.[46] Mere power partakes of the futility of Ozymandias in Shelley's poem of the same name.[47] The hero then is not the sufficient condition of historical action, nor is the exercise of power the sufficient condition of meaning.

If the effort to found meaning in history on the existence of heroes and the exercise of power is seen not to solve human enigmas but merely to reproduce them on grander scales, there are other alternatives remaining, to be sure. That alternative opposite the one just discussed would base historical meaning not on the side of action but of passion, and not on the side of the individual but of the group. That is, it would base meaning in history on what is suffered by the race. Thus it is the races or peoples opposing Alexander which give meaning to his exploits, for they afford the opportunity for his activity. Here the hero is still the bearer of meaning, but the groups opposing him are the occasion and opportunity of meaning.

As well it might be argued that the suffering of races yields not only the greatness of heroes, but of the race as well. Hence the Hebrews are raised to a position of eminence in history and by historians because they were singled out of a whole group of relatively insignificant tribes by their heroic perseverance. It might be said that power is on their side despite the desperation of their situation. Similarly Christianity is said to have supplanted the Roman Empire because the persecutions helped to unite the Christians at a time when the temporal basis of unity and authority was disintegrating. The difficulty of such a position is that it is a tacit reference to manifest destiny, and all encounters with other people are interpreted in terms of this destiny. Hence on seeing the Babylonian Ziggurat, the Hebrews had to fabricate the legend of the Tower of Babel in order to incorporate this astronomical watchtower into their moral view of the universe. Strictly speaking this fabrication was not a lie, for other ages have not been so interested as we in the pure, uninterpreted facts, nor so innocently trusting as to their accessibility. Nonetheless the case does exemplify an interpretation which rests more on a pre-established world-view and ignorance of the matter to be considered than on cautious deliberation. Similarly Christians frequently attribute the rise of Christianity to the Pax Romana (which was just too judicious to be accidental), treating the unity of the Empire as "the fullness of time" especially prepared by God to facilitate missionary endeavor. We may speculate that if Christianity had grown up under other circumstances, and had prevailed, its success would have been due to its ability to offer unity to a divided world. In both these cases the perplexity is obvious: myth and fact become indistinguishable in the grand narrative of the chosen ones; and there is no way to sort them out, especially when all success is "God's favor" and all failure, "God's chastisement."

A further viewpoint, one emphasizing action rather than passion, is provided here by populism. A great number of American political movements, for example, can only be understood by reference to a sense of urgency promoted by largely anonymous segments of the population. The "heroines" of Prohibition and Woman's Suffrage, the instigators of the Townsend Act, the lobbies and interest groups promoting or barring legislation--all become, in the hands of the historian, an anonymous influence. We wish here simply to state that their influence has not been destroyed by their anonymity.

Examples and viewpoints might be multiplied further. We have not yet discussed history from the viewpoint of the elite, be it the aristocracy or the intelligentsia. But the problems inherent in the precedental approach begin already to appear. In the first place, precedentalism is mimicry, and we have no examples of mimicry which are not also examples of decadence, e.g., the Hellenistic Age in the West: In an attempt to prolong the exhilaration of Greek culture, the West imitated the Greeks; but this proved to be paradoxical, for there is nothing less Greek than imitation. Furthermore, one can never be certain he has located a precedent for present historical action. One can never be certain that the conditions and resources of other places, other times are sufficiently like our own that actions based on past actions will yield the same or predictably similar results.

Finally precedentalism tends to rob the past of its seriousness. It refuses to allow that the personnel of the past was as vitally concerned with anything so much as with setting us the right example. It robs the past of the integrity of its situation: It makes World War II the reason the "founding fathers" warned against "entangling alliances." It clutters the past with prefigurations, predispositions, preparations, anticipations, etc. Indeed it regards the present as the moment in which it is glorious and fearful to be alive, as Armageddon in other words, and the culmination of the past. This of course effectively denies the nature of thought as act.

We see then the epistemological reasons for rejecting the thesis that the meaning of history lies in the past, namely in the fact that such a view minimizes the present moment. But it is this present moment which puts the question. This results then in a minimizing of the questioner and losing of the active self. Thought as act is compromised. And we have seen the epistemological reason for rejecting the thesis that the meaning of history lies in the present, namely in the fact that such a view absolutizes the present. But if the present is absolute, how does it need to wonder about its meaning? Hence the self, if here considered active, is absolutized as active, and thought as being is compromised.

The historiographic reasons for rejecting the theses that the meaning of history lies either in the past or the present (as opposed to the future) are remarkably similar to the epistemological. The rejection of the past as the bearer of meaning is based on the fact that such a view minimizes the present, disassembling it into a complex of themes each of which has a sufficient precedent. The present thereby loses its unique identity; its identity can no longer be located; the present is compromised, disassembled, scattered throughout the past. The nature of thought as act is compromised. As well the need for continuing to write History is lost: all history ought to have been satisfactorily recorded by now. The historiographic reasons for rejecting the present as the sole or sufficient bearer of meaning is that such a view absolutizes the present. It becomes enigmatic that history as a project should ever have arisen. The act of historical inquiry has no basis in an absolute present. Here again then the nature of thought as being is compromised.

The alternatives then to Bonhoeffer's more measured, cautious, and consistent approach involve themselves in a few basic problems. Either the present is made absolute, and the original project qua inquiry, (i.e., as arising out of genuine uncertainty) is betrayed; or the past is made to share the burden which the present will not bear and comes to assume the whole load, and the original project qua intending some (as yet undetermined) unique present solution to inquiry is compromised. The conclusion is inescapable that if there is a viewpoint on history adequate to establishing meaning, it cannot succeed by reference merely to the past and the present.

To insist, as this thesis does, on the reference to a proposed or anticipated future as necessary to the idea that history is in any sense complete, is to deny that history as past and present is a whole, even essentially, for us; or it is to assert that if it is a whole the means of our knowing this is not accessible in the past and present.

What has gone before in some respects merely applies a conclusion of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the evidence of history. Kant says,

> . . . the world can never be given as *complete*, and . . . even the series of conditions for that which is given as conditioned cannot, as a cosmic series, be given as *complete*.[48]

It would not be fair to the text of the *Critique* to overestimate the applicability of this remark to the issue at hand. One similarity must be pointed out however. For both positions the incompleteness of the object studied presents an absolute barrier to the establishing of a thorough science. Science as such must either await or procure the manifestation of "essences." We have seen that it is self-contradictory for thought to announce the completeness of its evidence. And we have seen that *awaiting* the fulfillment of the meaning of history is the only way for thought to procure the manifestation of the essence of history. Hence any attempt to found a science of history must submit to this condition, namely, that some sort of extrapolation is required.

Concrete, psychophysical *Dasein* putting to himself the question of the meaning of history can certainly increase the scope of his vision by participation in the historical community; but even so, history cannot become a science. This is not merely because history can never become experimental; geology is in most respects not experimental, and it is a science. Nor is it because the data of history are distant from us; the stars are more distant in time than is our genesis, and astronomy is a science. Nor is it for paucity of written records; a great deal is known scientifically about pre-literate man by the anthropological sciences. The problem is more general than this. The kind of data we lack is not something we can expect to gain from the translation of Linear A, the unearthing of Indus Valley cities, or the discovery of old trade routes. What we are seeking remains incomplete except at the cost of the search itself. When we are ready to declare that history has no meaning and that the search was folly, then we can be said to have ended (although of course not to have satisfied) the search. Nihilism then is the alternative to anticipation here, for the evidence does not yet manifest a comprehensive order. Yet against nihilism come all the arguments for order in the world--countless examples of well-run governments, renaissances, major movements which succeeded in their aims, etc.--that and the insistence that because Louis XIV did not live two centuries, we may not assert that his administration was worthless; in other words that a historical phenomenon is not worthless just because it is vulnerable to decay. Again we are caught in the same perplexity: The world is not absolute. The past does not exemplify _a_ meaning. On the other hand, the world is not nothing. The past offers some (admittedly inconclusive) evidence for many versions of meaning.

Here it would seem philosophy must stop. We have introduced the problem of historical knowledge as a conflict between thought as systematic and experience as historical. We have declared the problem to be one of resolving them without dissolving either one. We have put some restrictions on systematic thought, by refusing the system the right to close itself. We have investigated the epistemological and historiographical reasons for this, and we have concluded that history is not altogether meaningless on the one hand, but that, on the other hand, it does not clearly manifest a single, comprehensive type of meaning. This has been our philosophical conclusion. But is this a conclusion? Ought not philosophy begin rather than end here? Are not such perplexities the occasion rather than the conclusion of philosophy? To be sure we may not stop here but must search out the verdict of philosophy.

"The verdict of philosophy"--what meaning can such a phrase have in the skeptical atmosphere we have identified? How can philosophy be granted any unity if that larger body of evidence, the realm of history, is questioned as to its unity? Before attempting to resolve this question, let us briefly recapitulate our results this far.

A great deal has been said negatively: neither solely as act nor solely as being can thought be adequately described; neither the supermen nor anonymous groups are the true actors in history; neither Kantian-Hegelian transcendentalism nor Heideggerian ontology admits the possibility of Dasein's self-relating to a transcendent other in a decisive fashion. But no positive statement has yet been advanced which characterizes the fundamental relationship of man to his world. In order to do this effectively we must return to the philosophical tradition and characterize it, as Bonhoeffer would say, in a "stylized" fashion. What is it about the philosophical way of thought which must be examined? The theory of knowledge provides the most striking exemplification of the kind of issue which is at stake here.

Typically in the history of philosophy an epistemology sets up a model for knowledge and accommodates all other forms of knowledge to the model. If one form of knowledge offers a paradigm for all other types of awareness, then an analysis and presentation of that form will set the standarts for knowledge. Part of this role is played in this dissertation by historical thought; for it most characteristically represents certain factors of all human experience: its ambiguity, its incompleteness, its irreducibility to qualities or essences, etc. Other aspects of this role, such as (generally) absoluteness, finality, incorrigibility, have no counterpart whatsoever in this dissertation: they simply have not entered into human experience except by what we shall presently be characterizing as an illegitimate introduction.

Yet there is one major issue, one philosophical commitment, which chapter two has developed in the terms of this epistemology, yet which chapter three has not yet investigated in terms of History. This is the problem of spectatorship. Spectatorship, as our remarks on Descartes have shown, requires the notion of primitive contact, the notion, that is, that the knower is in direct and immediate confrontation with the known. The philosophical tradition has rejected this idea in a significant fashion. Some brief recapitulation of this rejection must be undertaken here.

In ancient and early medieval philosophy four models for primitive contact are available. For Plato the beholding of the forms in the pre-existent state of the soul offers a visual model for knowledge. For Aristotle the receiving of the impression of the forms of ousiai on the soul offers a tactile model for knowledge. For Augustine the reception of sensations in the faculty of inner sense provides the only primitive contact. And for Bonaventure the vision of God, and only that vision, is pure vision. In accordance with the models, other forms of knowledge are honored insofar as they approximate to the paradigm, and error is also to be discussed in these terms. Hence for Plato the strength or weakness of recollection, which provides access to the forms, serves as a gauge for knowledge and error. For Aristotle the clarity of the impression stamped on the soul serves as the gauge. Of course here some modifications must be allowed due to the Aristotelian presupposition of the hierarchical arrangement of nature. For Augustine all higher forms of knowledge are constructed out of the lower, in accordance with a gauge--the inner light provided by God. And for Bonaventure all forms of knowledge other than the vision of God are subordinated to that paradigm and have reality only insofar as they lead to it.

With the modern continental tradition a tendency similar to Bonaventure's arises, namely to consider the higher functions of the mind to offer the most reliable access to reality. Hence the goal of quantification and calculation in Descartes, gauged by clarity and distinctness, and the goal of rationalization in Spinoza. The British empiricists maintained the primacy of sensations or phenomena--Locke's qualities, Hume's sensations--and the gauge for knowledge, namely departure from the model, naturally led to skepticism as regards the more complex questions of meaning in the universe.

With Kant, as we have seen, the primitive contact is sensation; but here a quite radical innovation is made: the criterion or gauge of knowledge is no longer to be associated with the primitive contact. Phenomena are never really passively entertained in any aspect of conscious experience, for they are rendered representations in order to be accommodated to consciousness. Hence in Kant, primitive contact is repudiated. But Kant, being the true apologist for

Leibniz, continues the individualistic orientation of knowledge. The individualistic orientation in Leibniz is strong: the monads are windowless entelechies--entelechies well illustrated by the heroes of the *Bildungsroman* genre to which Leibniz' indirect contribution is surely great.

This individualistic orientation is continued in Hegel, of course, but before discussing that we must mention one more aspect of the early modern tradition: the moderns, especially Hume, rejected the ancients' versions of primitive contact because it was not really primitive; it included interpretation. Hence it did not represent simple receptivity. Kant admitted that the "reception" of any data into consciousness was interpretive, but, rejecting Locke's notion of the *tabula rasa*, he was able to assert that the necessary laws which governed the interpretation or construction were inherent in consciousness. Here there is no criterion for discovering what in one's consciousness is inherent (hence "necessary") and what is accidental (hence not inherent in reason, but peculiar to the individual).

This *petitio principii* is elevated to a principle in Hegel's philosophy, in order to get to the absolute standpoint. Primitive contact is a project to be established by the philosophy of Spirit, but as it happens what is established is the primitive contact of the self with the self. Such is reason's project, and, once complete, reason is no longer self-constituting act, but fully self-constituted being. For Husserl also primitive contact is to be established, not simply found, and it is Wesenschau which reason takes as its project. And finally for Heidegger primitive contact is to be found in the entertainment of Being, which can only be performed by the philosopher who renounces the fallen worldhood of das Man and interference with Being in favor of authenticity.

Every single view here limned suffers from the same essential problem: all renounce activity finally, or interpretation, in behalf of a passive state. Knowledge is a receptive affair; man's interference is repudiated. Here Heidegger's claims to be himself the true consummation of the philosophical tradition are vindicated. The goals of man's noninterference--exemplified in the beholding of Platonic forms, the receiving of impressions in Aristotle, the reception of sensa in St. Augustine, the incorrigibility which demands rather than invokes reason's assent, Kantian compliance with thought's rendering sensation representation, and Husserl's Wesenschau--all receive their culmination in Heidegger's prevailing upon us not to interfere with the march of Being. Even Hegel's absolute standpoint achieves a spectator status: reason's nature is to perform reason's nature. When the performance is completed, reason must simply observe itself. This attempt to achieve spectator status is the extreme of the cor curvum in se, as we have seen, and we must reject it. But we have seen another tendency in the philosophical tradition which this dissertation wishes to push to its completion, namely the rejection of primitive contact. Far from renouncing the tradition and its basic concerns as a whole then, this dissertation seeks to further some of its most fundamental tendencies.

What previous chapters have argued, but which only now becomes justifiable as a claim, is that the position presented in this dissertation rejects both the notion of primitive contact and hence the goal of spectatorship. It claims that the former is not possible and the latter not desirable. But with the repudiation of the former, all criteria for reason seem to be lost. And with the renunciation of the latter, this loss seems to be unalterably sealed.

As we have seen, the modern tradition rejected the ancients and medievals partly because the latter wrongly attributed primitiveness. Likewise we have in chapters one and two criticized the moderns for their failure to see that man cannot by himself supply a substitute for primitiveness: The "self-approval of reason" may be exalted, but self-approval is a criterion we have found inadequate to true epistemology. But not to minimize the fruits of idealism, the standards must come from man's reason in some fashion: they do not spring upon us from the empirical universe, from logic texts, or full blown from the head of Zeus. Hence they must arise, if at all, within the community.

That is to say that idealism is correct in asserting that ultimately reason is the source of criteria. But reason could not be extricated from personal bias. As an example of what is here asserted, we might look to Plato: Socrates was informed that man is the measure. Instead of disputing the remark on its own terms, Socrates demonstrated its essential triviality by showing the difficulties of relating "man" as a concept to empirical men.

Similarly here we are rejecting idealism's claim that reason is the source of all criteria by showing that the claim is not significant if reason is inaccessible. Reason is inaccessible here of course because it is so inextricably bound up with individuals and their personal lives. The significance of the community here is that this is where Dasein comes to understand himself concretely by undertaking this extrication. To fail to do so of course is to suffer the _cor_ _curvum_ _in_ _se_. To attempt to do so is to learn of the universality of interpretation in human experience.

The development of criteria within the community seems to assume that some sort of evidence is to be treated. This evidence we have seen is never received wholly passively and is never complete or consummated in the present. Its availability is never simple or fulfilled presence. Hence a reference to the future is required and as well a means of participating in that future. This mode of participation we have called faith. The mode of this participation has yet to be discussed. But before undertaking this project, we may enumerate a few of the conclusions of these chapters--conclusions with which we shall be working: 1) Primitive contact with "reality," a contact which one achieves by seeking out the mode of knowledge to which man makes no subjective contribution, a contact which may be either found or performed, is rejected, in total and in principle; and a kind of participation in knowledge, yet to be discussed, is asserted. 2) Likewise any theory of knowledge which attempts to rely on spectatorship is rejected. 3) The individual human being, as the isolable bearer of his humanity, is rejected, and the necessity (for epistemological and ontological discussion) of reference to man as a community is asserted. 4) The thesis that reality _is_ or has become fully constituted or fulfilled is rejected, and the necessity of reference to the future in any epistemic attempt to discern meaning in history is asserted. 5) It is affirmed that the possibility of establishing what is the case in any situation is not to be discovered in the situation merely as it appears, but as well in reference to the history of that situation.

To be sure, number five is corollary to number four; but it is made explicit here for the following reason. "Any situation" must include the present one, namely the project of exploring the presuppositions of thought in the realm of the philosophy of history. This situation too must be understood in terms of its history, namely the history of systems. This situation too must be a participant in, not a spectator of, that history. This situation too must refer to the community, in this case the academic community, for the confirmation of its conclusions. And this situation too must refer to a future, namely a proposed future in which it participates by anticipation and which it helps create by this participation. Such a future might for instance involve a contribution to the history of philosophical thought made by rendering explicit one of its own presuppositions (Doubtless the project need not succeed in order to have been a project.). Thus a general criterion frequently applied to philosophical systems is met here, namely self-applicability. The self-applicability of the system is violated for example in Hume's Treatise: if the characterization of human thought given there were true, human thought would not be capable of following the complexity of the characterization. Here we have applied the presuppositions we have developed, and no discrepancies have arisen. However, an ambiguity remains. What is meant by participation in the future? We have seen that the identity of Dasein exists in the future and that Dasein participates in this identity by faith. We have seen that the meaning of history exists in the future and that the community participates in this meaning by faith. And we have seen that Dasein participates in his identity only by means of the community.

The notion of participation is crucial here, for it sets up the universality of interpretation. Man's relationship to his world--the total complex of relationships which involve him--is always an interpretive one. There is no data--be it the empirical data of scientific philosophers or the pure vision of God of the mystic--which has legitimate claims to infallibility or primitiveness. There is no direction in which man can abstract, in the hope of exposing the world's "essential" features, which does not seriously alter or modify his situation. No aspect of the totality of his awarenesses can be singled out as paradigmatic, for the isolating of a "faculty" or the object of a faculty must be done in terms of all other faculties, and hence is an artificial and arbitrary matter. Sensation is frequently the faculty which is given this role, but sensation must be carefully distinguished from perception, imaging, representation, etc. before it can serve as a model. G. A. Paul's "Is there a Problem with Sense Data?" shows the difficulty of locating such a faculty and the arbitrariness of the vivisections it performs on consciousness.

This is not to say that no distinctions are meaningful. For example such a distinction as concept-percepts is generally useful, if not precise. But its utility arises out of the fact that it _is_ imprecise: it represents rather than faithfully reproduces two modes of consciousness; after all a faithful reproduction could not help but duplicate the problems it set out to solve. Lewis Carroll's example of the cartographers, who sought to create the best possible map by using a 1:1 scale comes to mind here. The resulting map was precisely the size of England itself, hence of no service, especially as the farmers would not allow the cartographers to spread the map out over their fields.

The whole of man's situation then is interpretive. Man seeks to understand himself and his world in terms which attempt to represent rather than to reproduce the experiences they refer to. Every experience bears with it a complex of meanings endowed not only by past experience of the individual but as well by the experience of his society, indeed by the whole of his past. Man's past then is heritage; his present is _Lebenswelt_. This is why there is no past that "there is." The past is heritage, as yet unfulfilled by the present, to be fulfilled only in the future. This is also why there is no present that "there is." The present as _Lebenswelt_ has the character of a project. Only for Hegelian _Geist_ can one's project become one's circumstance. For a history that is radically man's the present cannot be its own fulfillment.

Hence everything about man's present involvement in the world involves interpretation. His epistemological-ontological situation, as abstracted from his historical situation, offers no primitive contact with the world. His temporal situation as the present stage of a projected heritage offers no simple, uninterpreted sequence of factual events. His social situation offers no isolation from the tendency of the community to involve man and complicate his situation. And finally his experienced situation offers such a rich and complex interaction of epistemology, ontology, history, and community as to rob man of the possibility of understanding in any fashion other than the historical thought we have outlined. To think one's way outside this situation of involvement and interpretation and, having done so, to try to understand what man is, is folly. Just as the ancients did not fully understand that the setting up of a faculty psychology was only partly a matter of reading the data and was as well partly a matter of interpretation, and so left the criticizing of faculty psychologies to the moderns; and just as the modern empiricists criticized the faculty psychology while nonetheless failing to note that their sensationalism and phenomenalism were themselves highly interpretive--a discovery left to modern psychology; so our contemporaries have rejected metaphysics, while failing to criticize the position we have called naive, namely the belief in the availability of uninterpreted data or evidence.

This dissertation maintains the necessity of remaining critically involved with "the evidence" whatever that "evidence" may be "evidence-for." The belief in the possibility of finding the Archimedean point from which to launch an understanding of philosophy or history or man himself falls with the attempts to finalize our understanding of man. These fall with our admission of the possibility of future definitive encounter. And this admission follows the discovery of the self-contradictory consequences of the alternatives. Man's knowledge then is always man's: that is the condition of its existence. It has his stamp upon it. All that his knowledge touches retains the trace of that touch. Wherever he steps he leaves his traces. The territory man covers bears his footprints. He may not see those in which he is still standing, but he has but to look behind him to see that they follow him and lead to his present position. For where they point, of course, he must look ahead. To be sure this looking ahead refers to the participation in the future by anticipation. There are several major senses of this participation which must be explored.

In chapter one we have characterized human thought as obligated to honor its dual role as act and as being. In chapter two we have shown that this is only possible by recognizing the constant future reference of thought and the role of community. In chapter three we have discovered the nature of thought's historicity and have come to acknowledge the universality of interpretation in human thought.

The full meaning of these discoveries however cannot be disclosed until we have explored the concrete and specific senses in which human thought is able to participate interpretively and in community in its own anticipated future. This project will constitute the second part of this dissertation.

PART II

THE MEANING OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE FUTURE

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SCIENTIFIC CONCRETIZATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

Part I has established the necessity of remaining critically involved with our world. As a corollary to this position the goal of final knowledge, an adequation of intellect and things, has been renounced in favor of an integration ("*adequatio mentis et vitae*"[49]) of thought into historical experience. This integration necessitates the conclusion that the nature of thought cannot be expressed in terms of classical receptivity, medieval adequation, Cartesian mastery, or Hegelian appropriation. Rather than achieving these "goals," thought must maintain a critical involvement which is intensified by the loss of the illusion of primitive contact.

Yet primitive contact is an important methodological category and cannot simply be dismissed. The approximation to primitive contact which this dissertation advances is projective and anticipatory, and its field of operations is the future: specifically we have seen that the confirmation of knowledge of the historical world awaits the manifestation of the consummate essence of the present in the future.

There are several general directions in which such a position might be and has been developed. These are the senses of participation Part I has mentioned. In this and following chapters we shall deal with four of these. The first of these, dealt with in this chapter, will treat the thesis that the future is non-specifically committed, i.e., that history is a realm of solely denotative objects and that no specific transcendental commitment is possible. The second and third of these, dealt with in chapter five, will treat the thesis that the future is specifically and transcendentally committed. Chapter five will deal with religious eschatology, then, and in two modes, classical eschatology and the critical eschatology of Bultmann. The fourth alternative, treated in chapter six, will deal with "secular eschatology," and hence chapter six will provide a natural alternative to chapter five.

The first sense of the participation in the future as has been indicated, is the participation in the future as non-specifically committed. This phrase indicates a position which might recognize in a general sort of way that the epistemology we have developed is sound, i.e., that participation in the future through anticipation is indeed a presupposition of human thought. This position may well recognize that the rendering explicit of this presupposition which is performed here intensifies our participation. But the position we wish to discuss at this point, though allowing the general thesis that a future participation is presupposed, still refuses to admit that a universalizing of this procedure is entailed in the logic of our epistemology. There are several ways in which barriers might be set up to oppose the conceptual universalizing of the human community. Such a project will be the topic of this chapter and might be developed as follows.

Granted that the nature of man is a problem, perhaps the problem for us, we cannot be sure that it is the same problem as faced, say, by the Aztecs, or even our Victorian forebears. It may be for example that simpler societies are so much bound by their mythological world-views that the idea of history and of deliberate participation in history by anticipation and action in accordance therewith are incomprehensible to them. Such a project might well threaten their whole social structure. So, far from constituing an "essence" for mankind, then, the idea of participation might actually threaten that enterprise. We may even find that so far as arriving at a "common humanity" is concerned, we are forced back on even less than a biological definition.

Furthermore, if definitive encounter with a transcendent other met in an anticipated future is decisive, the objection might well continue, it will surely be the case that communities are differentiated essentially from one another by the fact that they have encountered various oppositions or by the fact that some have undergone such encounter while others have not.

If men as communities are to go forth to meet the future, this objection continues, surely this project will differentiate communities. Surely their various successes in different directions will contribute to centrifugal rather than parallel impulses. The success, for example, of denominational pluralism in creating strong, self-sustaining sects among American Christians stands in the way of, rather than enhances, the possibility of Church unity. The general success of the nation-state as a means of political organization may create strong states to negotiate with one another, but this very strength stands in the way of, rather than enhances, the possibility of world federation. Both strong denominations and strong nations are unlikely to give up any of the sovereignty they consider intrinsic to that strength.

A second aspect of this general objection might be argued as follows: Although it may be admitted that any attempt to divide history into centuries, ages, or cultures is somewhat arbitrary, it still might be objected that such a division is not without its point; and the projection of the universal community as uniting various diverse cultures and as articulating their principle of unity is far from sufficient. Consequently it would be argued that the commonality which gives meaning to "humanity" is quickly reduced to a myth when one takes into consideration the diversity of cultures throughout the ages. If we grant that the biological similarity is as strong a similarity as can be found, and if we grant that the intensification of this similarity to the cultural level is an epistemological necessity, have we not thereby agreed to overcome cultural differences? And is this not an obvious evil? Is not diversity itself a kind of insurance against monolithic tyranny?

As a third aspect of this general objection, it might be argued that there are a great many types of knowledge which require no hypothesis of the future in which radical change may damage the whole enterprise. Mathematical truths are such; so are logical truths. As well most historical data: "Nicolas II is dead." is such a remark. Of course if the remark is made at the time of the Czar's death, a "future" reference to at least the completion of the revolution is necessary for establishing whether Nicolas was "assassinated" or "executed." But the mere note of his death requires nothing except itself to be meaningful. As well many scientific remarks are true without reference to any hypothesized future. Sugar dissolves in water and the earth turns on its axis regardless of whether the Lilliputians go Communist next week.

In the fourth place it might be objected that such a view as is maintained in Part I is an affront to the philosophical tradition insofar as that tradition sees Parmenides as its major precursor, for it fails to see that what is *is* and what is not *is not*. Rather it pretends that what is before us cannot be said to exist fully, for it is not fulfilled, and that what is not present before us may exist and await us in the future. In putting this barrier between man and essences, it robs knowledge of all claims to necessity.

And finally in the light of these objections it might be advanced that Part I presents inadmissible claims, although not claims which are incomprehensible. To complete these objections then, the following pathology might be offered. The expectation of a fulfilling future is the expectation of the vindication of one's own cultural involvement. One sees classical culture swallowed up in decadence, Roman grandeur squandered in imperial intrigue, neo-classicism dissipated in revolution; and one hopes that the future will be kinder to one's own age. It is an attempt to use the future against itself, namely for essentially conservative purposes.

How shall the claims of this dissertation deal with these objections? The first two objections are quite similar, their major differences being that the latter articulates the arbitrariness of the distinction they both oppose, namely the partitioning of historical data into cultures, ages, etc. But where exactly is the unity which constitutes the common humanity of Man? To say that all are men, all rational animals, etc., is not only trivial, but as well begs the question. We are already operating at a more complex level than that. The question we are asking is whether the reference to the centrality of projective historical involvement makes them more similar than dissimilar. It might be said that the diversity of cultural orientations toward the ideal of the community of mankind is less significant than other cultural commonalities, such as statecraft, religion, marriage, distribution of labor, etc. But this assumes rather than proves the weight to be given to each of the separate forms of evidence.

Perhaps we should compare our society with others with which we are familiar, but the fact that one is yet critically involved with the character of one's society exaggerates the difference seen in comparing one's culture with foreign cultures, for we do not see the critical involvement of men of foreign cultures so readily as we see our own. We tend, for example, to see socialism as a quality of British life, fixed and unquestioned, rather than as an issue with which the Briton struggles. We see France's opposition to Britain's entry into the European Economic Community as a defining characteristic of Frenchmen, rather than as an issue still to be dealt with.

But this is still to argue on strictly empirical grounds. Part of this difficulty might be overcome if we ignore our own culture, because of our involvement therein, and search out the common meaning of "humanity" in foreign cultures. So as not to prejudice the case too much, let us choose cultures of different periods of history. Twentieth Century Russia and Ancient Egypt, say, both demonstrate the problems of combating famine in a large nation insufficiently protected by natural boundaries--thematically the problems of mastering circumstance and fate. If we are reminded that both Joseph-son-of-Jacob and Josef Stalin instituted seven-year-plans, we laugh, for the similarity, though precise, is frivolous: the similarity of names and of the duration of programs is surely coincidental. But the earnestness which underlies both does not escape us; nor does the value of strong centralized government. Nor indeed does the commonality which we have mentioned so often, namely of taking the future as promised to one (or of taking oneself as promised to the future). The "participation" in this case seems weak, for one does not quite participate in the future by present manual labor. However the anticipation inherent in labor directed toward expected or present obstacles itself constitutes a participation. Whether this anticipation takes the form of astrology, as in many ancient cultures; aggression, as was the case for the Mongols, Huns, Goths, and countless other "barbarian" tribes; or management, as is the case for the European Economic Community--the participation in encounter by anticipation here constitutes the universality of humanity in as strong a sense as we can maintain it here: at this point we can but safeguard the nature of thought as act.

It is because we are arguing on largely empirical grounds that we have safeguarded only the nature of thought as act. But what was at issue here was the commonality of humanity, namely the nature of thought as being. Does not our argument thus far merely admit the impossibility of finding the essence of humanity which will constitute the unity of humanity? Indeed this is the case with this method. That is to say this is the case if one takes this "humanity" to have been already constituted, and to be evidenced in the past, merely awaiting our discovery. But surely it comes as no surprise that the past is simply not the place to search for the essence of humanity, but that this is a yet-to-be-constituted-essence in which one participates, both epistemologically and existentially, by anticipation.

As for acknowledging and protecting cultural diversity, it is surely correct to admit that, as an extreme case, tribal social units do not participate in the dreams of the West. It is not, however, correct to say that they should be consigned to superstition and ignorance. It is furthermore correct to wish to protect the cultural distinctiveness of various societies. But what is being proposed here in no way threatens this variety. The advantage of a freely entered community, as opposed to an imposed unity, is that community preserves difference, whereas unity imposes uniformity.

The third objection advanced by the hypothesis that the future is non-specifically committed is that there are many kinds of knowledge which require no hypothesis of the future. Among these are mathematics, logic, scientific knowledge, and isolated historical data. It is fairly obvious that the greater the degree to which a science neglects the hypothesis of the future consummation of essences, the greater the degree to which it can abstract from historicity. This follows obviously from the interchangeability of two terms which this dissertation advances: historicity, on the one hand, and, on the other, the necessity of a future reference. What is not obvious is the respect in which a response of this type, addressed to the third objection, will also satisfy the fourth, namely the reference to Parmenides. In response to these objections, then, we must refer to our previously developed epistemology from chapters one and two: if in this dissertation we were asking after the meaning of thought, we could refer merely to the connotative realm, the realm in which Pure Absolute Spirit is its own object and announces its own meaning. Our answer then should be Hegel's answer. But we are asking a question of meaning in history, a realm which is full of denotative objects. The meaning of history then is a question which will not allow itself the luxury of pure connotation: in the historic realm pure connotation is romantic at best, autistic at worst. We must then pose the question of the object: how does historical knowledge stand with the scientific object?

We are frequently led to believe--and the misunderstanding is philosophy's more than science's--that the object subjected to scientific scrutiny is somehow--probably by Mill's method--rendered unambiguously present to the investigator. This presence has frequently been attacked in this dissertation, but only in the realm of "the humanities," for there it is fairly obvious that the investigator makes a definite contribution to the data. In the physical sciences it is less obvious that this is the case. It will be argued that this contribution is merely less obtrusive in the sciences because more common. That is to say the practice of ignoring the subject is elevated to a carefully guarded principle in the physical sciences. To this question Martin Johnson (_Time, Knowledge and the Nebulae_) has addressed himself:

> The sciences have the easier task of creating their objective nature to be as free from subjective considerations as possible. It is the task of metaphysics, not the physical or even mental sciences, to apportion responsibility--if it can--between the subjective and objective terms in the irreducible relation of experience. This condemns metaphysics to lack forever the proofs which are sought with success in science and which are justified within the closed abstractions of an observable Nature. . . .[50]

But to be more specific--the knowledge of the physical object, say a chemical compound, is certified in a variety of ways: its boiling point might be checked, it might be investigated spectrographically or chromatographically, its physical properties and reactions with known chemicals might be checked, etc., until the compound is identified. In such a situation it is difficult to see what contribution the observer makes other than mere manipulation. But in fact the contribution is only concealed by its universality. A spectrum is useful only if one assumes that, for example, a chemical compound at a given temperature emits photons at a uniform rate. A chromatograph is reliable only on the assumption of a uniform relation between chemical attraction and retention rate. The assumption of uniformity is the *sine qua non* here. In other sciences, astronomy, for example, the heliocentric hypothesis is to be established only by assuming that the general law of gravity is uniform throughout the solar system. In geology and paleontology, the dating of specimens depends on the hypothesis that Carbon 14 disintegrates at a uniform rate and that geological processes have always occurred at the same rate as that at which they now occur.

We have argued before that science, in order to be worthy of the name, must either await or procure the manifestation of some analogue of essences. The physical sciences then are performing an essence-procuring function in these hypothetical attributions of uniformity. In a simple selection an attribute is posited as essential: "We have no reason to suspect that Carbon 14 has an erratic rate of deterioration. Let us consider it uniform and use it as a standard." "We have no reason to suspect that geological processes are either accelerating or decelerating. Let us therefore assume that they are uniform." Etc.

What is the character of these "essences?" They are, for the most part, statistical abstractions. The electron is not a particle in a place for our science, but an energy state "in" a statistical "cloud." Laws of mechanics do not describe particular objects, but rather ideal entities. Particular objects can only be approximated to statistically. Such treatment of course effectively replaces the realist's object with a statistical abstraction.

The notion of statistical confirmation marks the entry of the future reference in several ways, for that complex combination of empirical generalizations and experimental preconditions which we call scientific law has precisely this character of applying precisely and completely only in an ideal future, an ideal future which may never become present, but whose proposal is the only justification for present endeavor.

One of the most obvious functions of the hypothesis of the future in scientific endeavor is to be seen in prediction: for many sciences a statement is true if it correctly predicts anticipated phenomena. Hence if Newtonian mechanics predicts a certain position for the planet Mercury, and it is found in another position, something is amiss. If particle physicists can successfully predict the appearance of a particle which has not yet been discovered, then the laws assumed in their prediction procedures are reinforced. "Reinforced," that is, as opposed to "confirmed"--for final confirmation cannot be achieved short of the universalizing of the scientific project: until science can explain all phenomena, no scientific hypothesis whatsoever can properly be said to have been absolutely confirmed.

But the sciences, as has been noted before, abstract from the subject. Hence they might be able to yield a great deal of information, yet a priori, such information is of itself meaningless. This is not to detract from its complexity, its precision, its beauty, its predictive ability, or its capacity for yielding surprises. It is merely to assert that science contributes only minimally and inadvertently to the question of the meaning of historical human existence when that question is construed as demanding certainty or essences.

Thus the character of human knowledge in a universe of denotative objects is seen to be, as we have typified it, projective, procuring essences through the anticipatory participation of human interpretation. Hence, as has been stated, a history which yields uninterpreted or noninterpretive "information" or "facts" is meaningless. But what must be the character of "meaning" if this is the case?

The term "meaning" has been previously employed to denote a reference to the subject: it must include reference to the subject if, a priori, abstraction from the subject precludes meaning. As well, in accordance with another previously mentioned condition, it must have reference to the object, for as chapter one has established in its critique of Hegel, pure subjectivity as well is meaningless, pretending as it does that the subject is in some sense absolute. Meaning then must have a double reference. It must be the meaning of the object (of the universe, finally) for the subject (finally, for humanity). Meaning of objects without subjects is impossible. Meaning of subjects without objects is trivial.

It is thus that seemingly "objective," "scientific" data concerning historical events must be criticized. It is true that Nicolas II is dead. It is true, that is, in the attenuated sense of being reliable information. But it is not meaningful. If we wish to give it meaning, we must suppose along one of several possible lines. On the one hand we may suppose that the Communist Revolution is a world-sweeping humanitarian movement seeking the overthrow of tyranny and privilege in favor of establishing the dignity and integrity and joyfulness of us all. In such a case the execution of Nicolas II is the declaration of the rights of industrial man. On the other hand we may suppose that the Communist Revolution is a very clever form of exploitation aimed at world domination. In such a case the assassination of the Czar was the destruction of the last bastion of deliberate high culture in Russia. Or thirdly we may suppose that the Communist Revolution was justifiable in itself as the last resort of an exploited populace, yet unjustified in its exportation. In such a case, the execution of the Czar was understandable, if regrettable.

In _any_ case the establishing of the death of the Czar is not at stake: the establishing of its meaning is what is at stake. And the establishing of any particular meaning is a project which depends on the participation of the whole human race, if not directly, at least indirectly. This universalizes the subjectivity. As well the "event" must be placed into its total historical context. This universalizes the objectivity. But one factor remains unaccounted for: We may take a charitable view of Communism as a world phenomenon and contribute to its liberation of humanity at large; or we may take a critical view of it and oppose its growth. This accounts for the third factor, for it universalizes participation.

In either case neither meaning is established until it has an objective as well as a subjective reference. The prospering of whole societies under Communism is necessary to establish its beneficence. The oppression of societies is necessary to establishing its demonic character. Thus the meaning of the Czar's death is to be ascertained only by the participation of humanity. In this case humanity must participate, or refuse to participate, in Communism.

The fourth objection complains that the theses so far developed in this dissertation are an affront to the Parmenidean origin of philosophy. If the true meaning of Parmenides' statement that what is is and that what is not is not is, as Hegel's philosophy of history would indicate, that what is Is, i.e., that what exists is absolute and necessary, and that what does not exist is absolutely impossible--if that is Parmenides' meaning, then it is true that it is denied here. It is in fact the case that, in more methodological terms, we are here denying that two ontological levels are sufficient.

If on the other hand we suggest that Parmenides' meaning is that what is known Is, and what is not known is impossible, then it must again be affirmed that the situation is more complex than this and that "Parmenides'" error is that he takes the isolated or isolable person to be the proper subject of knowledge. That of course is denied by our first chapter inasmuch as it affirms that the necessity which classically accrues to knowledge must be sublimated--put off awaiting the universal human community.

But it is likely that neither of these views really speaks to Parmenides' concern. As regards that concern, that intellectual shock at and repulsion from the idea that an object might participate in both Being and Nothing, we must assert that this issue is foreign to the project at hand, since this project does not begin with the assumption of an ontological level which requires this notion of participation.

It might further be remarked that Hegel's Logic provides the most satisfactory answer to this issue in its elaborate proof of the general thesis that Pure Being and Pure Nothing are one and the same. For our project however, participation is a performative function, not a question of ontological state. For our project and our terminology, "participation" refers to persons, and is something one elects to do. One "participates" not merely in ontologically assigned categories or forms. One participates not merely by virtue of his being, but by virtue of his thought. One participates in the future by attempting to make that future precise in faith, by attempting to make it universal by action, and by attempting to make it actual by hope.

Finally, regarding the pathology of conservative purpose, it may be asserted here that the hypothesis of the future is neither essentially conservative nor progressive. "Progress," be it essential progress or merely motion, may merely create distractions or it may uncover limits intrinsic to humanity. No attitude toward progress is a priori generated by this dissertation.

The first of our alternatives then, the future as non-specifically committed, has offered several possibilities for rendering our major claims concrete or for attenuating them. The first of these is that cultural diversity and historic change stand in the way of locating an essence for humanity. This has been admitted, but its argumentative strength has not, for it has nowhere been asserted in this dissertation that the essence of humanity has been fully constituted. The second objection has argued that many essences are available without the contribution of the knower. This has been refuted. The third has argued that the position of this thesis fails to comprehend Parmenides' contribution to thought. The limited relevance of this charge has been discussed. And the fourth objection has made the dissertation an apology for progress or a hindrance to it. This has been shown to be clearly false.

In chapter three we have shown the impossibility, in Bonhoeffer's phrase, of 'hunting down the "da" of history.' As well we have seen that history is not complete, even essentially, and is thus a project. The hypothesis of a future which is non-specifically committed, on the other hand, merely detracts from the project of history as it has been epistemologically necessitated by these arguments. If meaning in history is possible--which remains to be seen--it is not possible in the terms of the alternatives to our position which are formulated in this chapter. The hypothesis of the future non-specifically committed can offer only reductionist and/or centrifugal tendencies. If knowledge, in any genuine sense, is to be possible, if meaning is to be achieved, this hypothesis must be abandoned, since it merely detracts from the project.

We have shown in this chapter then that the affirmation that the future is non-specifically committed is untenable. It is simply not valid to assert that history is incapable of manifesting a unity of purpose. It may very well be the case that it has not to date demonstrated such a unity. Such a statement may be accepted without damage to any of the theses asserted in this dissertation. But the stronger statement that history is incapable of unified meaning can only be made on grounds which epistemologically this dissertation cannot honor, for such a final statement depends on the recognition that the essence of history is already manifest, a claim for which we have found no adequate epistemology.

In conclusion, we have seen that the writing of history demands a knowledge of the nature and destiny of man. And we have seen, furthermore, that an act of projective faith, which takes this unconstituted nature and destiny as constituted by attempting to read the character of its constituting processes, is required, then, in order to make conclusions regarding history possible. We have shown then that epistemology is part of ontology, that the process whereby man comes to understand himself becomes thereby intrinsic to the self he comes to understand. It is thus that history comes to provide the model for epistemology. The view that the future, the object of the act of projective faith, is non-specifically committed (i.e., that the process is a multiplicity and not a unity) has been discussed in this chapter. This view took the fact that epistemology is part of ontology to be a challenge and sought by scientific method to extricate epistemology, the better to discard ontology. Its failure stems from the fact that it was unable to abstract from the subject without sacrificing epistemology. The new view for consideration, far from trying to unravel the mutuality of epistemology and ontology, seeks to collapse it into a unity, thereby elevating epistemology to ontological significance. In this way it generates eschatology. This is our next major concern.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ESCHATOLOGICAL CONCRETIZATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The view that the future is eschatologically committed elevates the subject and connotation, as opposed to the view that the future is non-specifically committed, which elevated the object and denotation. Such a view, that the future is eschatologically committed, legitimately falls under our general thesis that an hypothesis of the future is an epistemological presupposition of human thought. Yet here thought as introspective is given the prerogative. Such a formulation of our general thesis might well be undertaken in defense of religious belief. This chapter and the next seek to explore this possibility and to challenge this formulation. This chapter will deal with the two historically significant aspects of religious eschatology, namely classical Christian eschatology and the eschatology of Rudolf Bultmann. The following chapter will deal with the varieties of secular eschatology.

This alternative to our position might be developed as follows: We have seen that the writing of history requires the completion of the project of human nature. Thus whatever completes human nature completes history. The acts of divine intervention and redemption performed in history's central act, namely the Christ-event, are the acts which complete human nature--so the individual believer testifies, and so the Church--and are thereby the acts which give meaning to history. We are promised to the future by the words of Christ ("I go now to prepare a place for you; if it were not so I would have told you." John 14:2), the eschatological hypothesis continues, and the future is promised to us ("On this rock I build my Church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Matt. 16:18) The continuation of temporal history after this event is like the continuation of World War II after Normandy: there are still small skirmishes to be fought, but the decisive victory has already been scored.[51] The major concern of history then has been accomplished, and the action of the Church in spreading the community of the faithful is the only remaining activity which is of truly ultimate concern.

Briefly that is eschatology's case. But to state it so briefly is to compromise its gravity and to caricature its appeal. Let us then develop its case more fully.

The central concern of this dissertation is no stranger to religious thought. Religion seeks to address the total man in his most profound ontological commitments. It seeks to tutor men to debts they had not acknowledged and privileges of which they were not aware. In general the religious impulse can be said to heighten and quicken all of man's responses to his world, regardless of their object, and so sweepingly revises his appreciation of his world that man calls his world renewed, a gift. It becomes miraculous to him in all its aspects. And it troubles him that he did not always find it so, indeed that for lack of energy and imagination he frequently is unable to sustain the vision of the world as created; that he falls into mediocrity, into the quotidian, into everydayness. Furthermore, in his interaction with others (as well as with nature, except less obviously so with nature) he finds he compromises their integrity: frequently his actions serve as a barrier to his neighbor's appreciation of the world. Not only does one do this carelessly, in his thoughtless ordinary interactions, but heedlessly in wars, economic exploitation, etc.

All these prevent the development of human potential and inflict losses on the universal project of constituting the community of mankind. These activities--not merely in their overtness but as well in their covert foundations in human nature--constitute what Christianity refers to as "sin." In the state of sin men cannot form the community which is intrinsic to the universalizing of human intercommunication. That is to say, the state of sin is self-enclosing, as an ontological category. It belongs to the realm of Being. As such it is powerless to escape itself and declares itself self-sufficient.

The similarity between this presentation and the theses of this dissertation is fairly obvious. We have seen, for example, that if left to itself the Hegelian project declares itself self-sufficient. Every attempt to escape itself is followed by a new synthesis which overcomes the attempt. It is thus self-enclosed. The state of sin, too, is in such a position, but not because it is omnipotent, as is Geist, but because it is inadequate to its proposed task. Indeed it is so incompetent that it cannot be trusted even to propose correctly.

Fortunately however this "treadmill self-confinement" has been broken up for us, according to the eschatological position we are here outlining: in the appearance of Christ this situation has become explicit, and alleviated for us. This occurs for the following reason. The appearance of God, as Christ, in history is the ultimate judgment on mankind. It is God the Omniscient's affirmation that human energies and potentiality are not worthy of the grand project of history, and that, if left to his own projects, man will but subvert history. Yet the appearance of God as well is automatically "redemptive" in some sense. That is to say, it performs our justification. God's willingness to appear indicates His willingness to continue His involvement with the least grateful of His creatures, man, and His willingness to salvage His rebellious creation.

The eschatological formulation of our hypothesis continues by arguing that the second sense of the redemptive aspect of God's activity occurs in the life of the individual believer. The individual believer finds his capacity for generous love is enhanced. The burden of exclusive concern with his past is lifted ("forgiven"), and he is able to participate in ever more complex communities of love and worship. Thus in the life of the individual believer, he comes to terms with his new status before God: Mankind has received a new status by virtue of the Incarnation. In the recognition of this new status on the part of the individual believer, he is "reconciled." That is to say he personally is reconciled to thinking of himself in terms of sin and grace; and the acceptance of that fact raises to a new level his ability to participate in the communion of those recipient of this view.

This community must, furthermore, be a forgiving community, for man is still not capable of (worthy of) perpetual peace. So long as less than the entire world is redeemed, the individual Christian still has a role to perform in this world. Christ is the exemplar of this role: when the activities and claims of Christ became fully known to those in authority, He was executed. For Christianity, however, this was a great victory: the secular world had expelled all its fury on the body of Christ, yet He still responded with forgiveness. Thereby he won the allegiance of even the soldiers who tortured, mocked, and killed him. That time is past, but its discipline is not. The Church is now the Body of Christ and must offer herself to the world as such in the assurance that when the world has exhausted its fury, it will confess Christ as the true source of power in the world. That future time of the Church Triumphant represents the third mode of redemption, namely "salvation." In anticipation of that future the individual believer has his strength--he lives from the future as well as towards it.

It is thus that the view of the future as eschatologically committed asserts its confidence in the nature of history and of man. In so doing of course it takes our entire epistemology, as thus developed, as its apology. Yet before such a position can be justified a certain collapse of epistemology and ontology must occur. This is performed as follows, by the eschatological hypothesis.

It is clear that the Gospel, as judgment and as victory, must apply to all men if it is to be universalized into the human community. It might be asserted that there are significant differences between men. But such a position would conceivably admit that some men have no need of the Gospel. Alternately then one must assert that the area of man's life that is touched by the activity of Christ is central, paramount. Such indeed is the assertion of Christianity when, for example, Paul says, "In Christ there is neither Greek nor Jew, bond nor free, male nor female." (Gal. 3:28); or when Christ puts the question "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his soul?" (Luke 9:25). Other examples might be cited here, their relevance to the program at hand being assured in Christ's assertion that a woman's faith had made her "whole."[52]

This is precisely the issue at hand then. The goal is the "wholeness" of man, i.e., the fulfilling of human nature, the consummation of a partially revealed essence. Its character as project is assured in Christ's command to "Go forth unto all nations baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." (Matt. 28:18). The epistemological significance of faith is recognized: "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the essence of things not seen." (Heb. 11:1). And the role of man, as awaiting the total consummation of his destiny out of a future in which he participates only by faith is exalted: "It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body." (I Cor. 15:44). The eschatological hypothesis not only closes its case with this reference, but as well wanrs us: "Those that have eyes to see, let them see."

In effect this says, "You have been given the power to judge competently. Don't judge incompetently." It assumes that agreement is the only competent judgment. Such assumptions are not uncommon in philosophy: if one disagrees with Hegel, one has not transcended the crass realm of denotation; if one disagrees with Heidegger, one is inauthentic; if one disagrees with a mystic, one is unenlightened. But a much more thematic examination of the eschatological argument must be made if we are to avoid its snares: intellectual arrogance is none the less devisive for the grandeur of its precedents.

Strictly speaking it is methodologically elementary that whatever completes human nature completes human destiny. On the basis of the definitions employed thus far, that is the only competent judgment. It is less elementary that this judgment commits us to eschatology, for it is less than certain that the "completion" of human nature can ever occur in an individual's life. Perhaps here we are faced with a simple alternative: either admit that the eschatological view misunderstands what is meant by the completion of human nature and thereby misapplies its version of this completion to the view of the individual here advanced; or admit that the eschatological view misunderstands the relation between the individual's humanity and that of the race and thereby misapplies its version of the fulfilling of the individual to the fulfilling of the race. In either case the eschatological view misappropriates the arguments here advanced. But this must yet be shown.

The view of the individual which this dissertation advances involves the possibility of constructive activity on the part of the individual. What is the goal? The goal is knowledge, including self-knowledge. What is the character of the knowing process which creates barriers to this goal? The character producing barriers is the inadvertent subjective contribution of the knower to the known. How shall we eliminate or control this contribution? We cannot eliminate it, so we attempt to control it by rendering it explicit and common through the agency of the community. And how shall we universalize this? Unlike Kant we cannot simply assume its universality without compromising the integrity of the individual; therefore it is by engaging other persons in the project that we must reach agreement concerning this subjective contribution. Yet what can be claimed finally for the project of knowledge? Is absolute knowledge of any sort possible?

It has already been argued in detail that there is no room here for a doctrine of primitive contact. Such a claim is obviously a rejection of correspondence theories of truth, and we have already shown that even for scientific knowledge the realist's object is simply ignored. Then are not the criteria for answering the eschatological claim already provided? It would seem so. If no basis can be made for claims to knowledge adequate to an object, does this not apply all the more strongly to that most complex of all objects, the human soul? Does not the legacy of Freud stand as adequate demonstration that the human soul is never fully self-aware, but always in danger of concealing from itself its most fundamental motives? Again, it would seem so. But the eschatological claim is not so easily dismissed.

It is certainly true, the eschatological thesis might argue, that the ego tries to conceal its baser motives in order to flatter itself. But the case of Freudian psychology is hardly relevant here, for the redemptive activity which the soul undergoes is first and foremost a source of humiliation and only later does the soul recover in gratitude. Far from concealing the depth of its own depravity, the soul is forced to acknowledge it and to recognize its extremity, neither compromising nor concealing what it finds. Furthermore the subjective contribution of the knower to the known, while certainly true of the scientific object, is hardly a fitting analogy for the relation of the knower to the known in self-knowledge. We may say that in scientific knowledge the knower speaks for the object. There is thus a twin contribution, which, we have seen, science seeks to control by standardizing--i.e., the knower, who "speaks" and the object, for which he speaks. But with the individual human being engaged in the process of self-knowledge, no such diremption arises; that speaking and that spoken for are one and the same. If any discrepancy occurs, it occurs in the **speaking,** for the speaker may not wish to represent himself truly before his peers. But this, while legitimately a failure of nerve, can hardly be called a failure of knowledge. It is surely because of the reliability of the knowledge that the knower may deliberately misrepresent himself.

In such a case then it becomes obvious that to argue for the elimination or control of the subjective contribution in self-knowledge is to miss the point. The sinner knows he is a sinner; he must merely be convinced that he should acknowledge this before the community of love which wishes to include him.

In reply it should first be remarked here that the doctrine of privileged access is not what is at stake here. One might very well argue that the self has privileged access to its own processes, i.e., access which other selves do not share and which it does not have to other selves, without admitting that the self has immediate access to itself. It is immediate access which is challenged, not privileged access. And challenging immediate access means, to use the vocabulary of chapter three, that the knower must remain in critical contact with the known object. In brief, then, we have simply applied our rejection of primitive contact to self-knowledge, for this is what it means to reject immediate access.

This might seem then to deny the existence of the soul, for it puts the soul on a par with all other objects of knowledge, but only in this one respect, namely that it does not escape the constant scrutiny of critical contact. To deny this is to resummon all the difficulties of the *cor curvum in se*. What does it mean then in terms of the knowledge of the self to claim that critical involvement also applies to self-knowledge? Such a claim of course can come as no surprise after the discussion already given in section two of chapter three, where we say that man's situation is always an interpretive one. Furthermore we have seen that interpretation is a highly complex act bearing reference to the community, to the future, and to the community's future. To deny any one of these is to fall into the *cor curvum in se*. Yet to affirm them is to deny the eschatological thesis its anthropology. That is to say the eschatological thesis is denied the right to define the salvation of any man. It has been discovered that the eschatological thesis points to a "saved" Christian and proclaims, "Here is the model for history." And we have denied that it is possible to have sure knowledge, in such a case, of just who might serve as such a model.

But even if we should grant this point to the eschatologist, we should be unable to honor his claim. Given an example, any example, it is here denied that it is possible to generate thereby the required historiography for an eschatology, for essentially the principle here assumed by the eschatological thesis is that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. This principle, developed by the Nineteenth Century German biologist Haeckel, claims that the development of the individual recapitulates the evolution of his genus. The principle has long since been abandoned in biology; but it still occurs frequently in philosophy when a member of a group is taken as typical of it. Hence it is presupposed that a member of the Church is typical of it; the ontogeny of salvation is outlined and applied to the history of the Church or of the race; and eschatology writes itself. The "principle" of such a procedure is thus the *petitio principii*.

The same problems arise here as arose in section one of chapter three where precedentalism is discussed, namely that the choice of a precedent is always risky business and the application in detail of the precedent to the object being investigated riskier still. Once again it must be affirmed that if meaning is to be found in history it must be found in the future, for the past simply does not manifest it. The effort of eschatology to claim that meaning has already been constituted in the past or present must be resisted. And once again it must be affirmed that participation in this meaning is only by faith. The effort of eschatology to claim knowledge in these matters must thus be rejected.

The eschatology we have just discussed might well be called classical Christian eschatology. In its broad outlines it can be attributed to Augustine and Eusebius, and it constitutes a genre in the corpus of patristic writing. It is an eschatology based on progressive manifestation of the Godhead, a Godhead which has however already been manifested in its definitive form in the Christ-event. The Incarnation then is the central historical reality. Everything previous to the Incarnation prepared for it, and everything after it celebrates it. That this is the origin of the notion of progress has been extensively, and I think conclusively, examined in the writings of J. B. Bury and Karl Löwith, both of whom conclude that the idea of progress stands or falls with the validity of eschatological thought. There has been proposed, however, an eschatology which is not of a progressive sort. It seeks to found meaning in history on what I shall call the perpetual Presence. The perpetual Presence of God is the central meaning of history in such eschatology, and historical thought has its (only) meaning therein. The propounder of this eschatology is Rudolf Bultmann. His position will be examined in the second portion of this chapter. Perhaps it can succeed where classical eschatology fails.

Bultmann's History and Eschatology is the major source for his position. It is an unusual work, as much for its unevenness as for its profundity, although its unevenness should be attributed to the fact that much is undertaken in a brief space, more than to any inconsistency of thought. Its reading of the history of ideas, especially of the history of historical thinking, has much in common with this dissertation, and several similarities will be pointed out. But its chief value for our purposes is its eschatology.

Bultmann begins with a few general statements regarding the nature of his project. He early points up the importance of concerning oneself with history, with community, and with self-knowledge. He is quite aware of the battering the notion of freedom has taken under Cartesian technics and British empiricism. He notes the contribution to historical relativism of Romanticism, and its latent anarchy. And he notes the transition from Graeco-Roman substantialism (". . . the historical agent is regarded as an unchanging substance in relation to which his actions are accident.") to a process orientation by way of Hume's substitution of mental process for mental substance.[53]

Against this general appraisal of the Western tradition Bultmann sharply contrasts an insufficiently appreciated source of that tradition, the thought of ancient Israel. For the ancient Israelites,

> If there is an interest in knowledge, it is in self-knowledge, and the historian calls his people to self-knowledge in reminding them of the deeds of God in the past and of the conduct of the people. This call is at the same time a call to responsibility in the face of the future which will bring welfare or destruction, the blessing of God or chastisement.[54]

Within this context the role of what this dissertation has called an orientation of anticipation is central and is still preserved in the Jewish Passover Vigil where "over against the time of salvation the whole previous history of the world is seen as a unity."[55]

This eschatological orientation, which Bultmann does not explore fully or even concretely, developed, he claims, into the Christian eschatological orientation, especially as it occurs in the writings of Paul, and is strikingly similar, unsurprisingly, to the view of Daniel. As Bultmann characterizes Paul's thought,

> . . . history is the expression of his view of man; man can receive his life only by the grace of God, but he can receive the divine grace only when he knows himself annihilated before God; therefore the sin into which man is plunged is paradoxically the presupposition for the reception of grace.[56]

Here then at the fountainhead of classical Christian eschatology we find the source of the position that the presence of God is total condemnation and simultaneously a reinstatement of man before God.

But it is in the writings of John, rather than of Paul, that Bultmann finds the chief Scriptural justification for his position. Paul is oriented toward the Parousia, the second coming of Christ. John is more concerned with the unfailing presence of the Holy Spirit. The delay of the Parousia of course accelerated interest in history, for the Church gained a tradition thereby. Yet this interest in the world was not a total immersion therein, for man was still promised to the future, i.e., to the kingdom.

Gradually this theological teleology became secularized; and for Bossuet, for example, the human situation which bewilders absolutist eschatology becomes a philosophical problem, that situation including above all the existence of evil. According to Bossuet no human power exists which does not serve designs other than its own, even in its evil self-seeking. Hence the secular world begins to shoulder the burden of teleology. This of course is but a step away from Hegel's List der Vernunft. The development of thought after Bossuet included the goal of total secularization of human life and thinking, amorally in the Enlightenment, moralistically in Kant, and post-religiously in Hegel. With this secularization we shall be more properly concerned in chapter six.

The problem Bultmann now raises is one we have dealt with in chapter three, namely "What is the real subject of history? Humanity? The nations? Civilization? The societies?--Man?"[57] Bultmann takes a stand for calling the free responsibility of man the central issue of history. Yet

> According to the Biblical understanding of man, responsibility for the past leads to the consciousness of being guilty before God, and responsibility for the future is to be taken upon me as an open readiness over against all that the future brings, gives, and demands.[58]

It must be noted here, although it can only be developed later, that Bultmann refers here to a "Biblical" view of man as representing some sort of homogeneous humanity. In accordance with this view, the will is considered the significant factor, for will grants participation.[59] Thus

> Only the historian who is excited by his participation in history (and that means--who is open for the historical phenomena through his sense of responsibility for the future), only he will be able to understand history. In this sense the most subjective interpretation of history is at the same time the most objective. Only the historian who is excited by his own historical existence will be able to hear the claim of history.[60]

Such a man

> . . . who understands his historicity radically, that is, the man who radically understands himself as someone future, or in other words, who understands his genuine self as an ever future one, has to know that his genuine self can only be offered to him as a gift by the future.[61]

Such a position seems to accord very well with the position this dissertation has advanced. One's true existence is a future one in which one participates by faith and hope and which gives one the resources for present living. It recognizes its source in Christianity and its mode of genesis in secularization. It recognizes that knowledge requires a reference to the subject as well as to the object, and that meaning must pertain to the whole. Furthermore it acknowledges the dangers of classical eschatology, both as leading to sacred history of the chosen people, and as theology. The problem with the former has already been discussed. The problem with the latter for our generation is that theology has not yet recovered from the critique of positivism.

There is however a certain inconsistency in Bultmann's language, for he seems to be unable to decide whether he adheres to Pauline or Johannine theology. The former eagerly expects the Parousia and is thus more consistent with Bultmann's references to the future. The latter celebrates the perpetual Presence and is thus more consistent with Bultmann's orientation toward man's responsible freedom. The former relates history and eschatology intrinsically, the latter accidentally. Which does Bultmann choose? It must be admitted that no reading of his book has convinced me that he is definitely committed to either one. No reading of his book, however, or of Scripture, has convinced me that the two can be reconciled. The decision as to which to attribute to Bultmann is then, in some sense, the reader's. I have chosen to attribute to him the Johannine because it is the last explicitly declared. His last chapter alternates views, and it is largely because Bultmann takes a Johannine position in his last paragraph that I have chosen to call it his own. The weakness of such a criterion is, I trust, obvious.

His conclusion is that

> Man who complains: 'I cannot see meaning in history, and therefore my life, interwoven in history, is meaningless', is to be admonished: do not look around yourself into universal history, you must look into your own personal history. Always in

> your present lies the meaning in history, and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only in your responsible decisions. In every moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must awaken it.[62]

Such a statement is clearly reminiscent of Martin Luther's remark on salvation, that in order to understand salvation one must believe that the entire theophany was performed just for oneself.[63] This centrality of the believing subject is crucial to both Bultmann's and Luther's work. From Luther's remark it is to be inferred that one is oneself the culmination of nature, just as for Hegel one must believe that one is oneself the culmination of spiritual development. For Bultmann, here, one believes that one contains within himself the transcription of the meaning of history. All three presuppositions--Luther's, Hegel's, and Bultmann's--are what chapter four calls essence-procuring hypotheses. They assume uniformity of the nature of selfhood and of its relation, respectively to salvation, Spirit, and history. Yet this is just the assumption which earlier generated the *cor curvum in se*. That is to say it is an assumption as yet unwarranted except in the purely connotative realm. But history, as we have seen, is not a purely connotative realm. So the assumption is inapplicable. One simply may not assert that every moment contains the possibility of being the eschatological moment. There are moments too trivial, too mundane, too frivolous, too preoccupied with other concerns. There are lives incapable of sustaining this perhaps mystical insight into the nature of things. But on more thematic terms, personal history may have meaning for the person, yet to fail to seek beyond this into the history of humanity is simple narcissism; it is the "treadmill self-confinement" Bonhoeffer speaks of; it is the _cor curvum in se_ which forsakes meaning in favor of connotation.

And so we must abandon eschatology. Whether it be the classical Christian eschatology which claims that cumulatively the moments of history constitute the grand design of the universe or the perpetual Presence variety of Bultmann which claims that separately the moments of history embody the grand meaning of the world--eschatology in either case makes claims it cannot substantiate. These claims are epistemological claims; they assert that history is a moving absolute or that it is a recurring absolute. In either case a temporal absolute, besides creating metaphysical problems of some weight, presents epistemological barriers. And they are precisely the problems of Aristotle's _De Anima_: if man is partly absolute, partly finite, how does one differentiate in order to provide continuity of the faculties in this world, discontinuity in death, and continuity of the person through death. Here we must ask Bultmann how it is that finite man entertains the absolute, how it is that he is the same person before and after the encounter, and how it is that there is discontinuity between the mundane and the eschatological. Indeed we can only conclude that these problems are adequate to justify our repudiation of eschatology and of the hypothesis that the future is eschatologically committed.

But do not these same problems rebound on the position we are advancing as well as on the eschatological? No, for these problems are incident on eschatology's claim to *entertain* the absolute meaning of history. They do not threaten our position, for our own position never claims to entertain the absolute, but only to anticipate it. The security of our position however is not without cost, for what is sacrificed is the claim to have absolute knowledge. But then is our position not needlessly timid? Is it not possible perhaps to turn this position into a more grandiose one? For example the Kantian project began as an attempt to restrict the claims of reason. The *Ding-an-sich* was opposed to phenomena and rendered inaccessible. This restricted reason to mere phenomena. But the Hegelian revision of Kant's system elevated the phenomena, making them worthy of a *logos*. A similar alteration might occur with regard to secular history and sacred history as occurred with regard to phenomena and noumena. That is, the rejection of sacred history might allow the elevation of secular history to a position worthy of a *logos*, to an absolute status. The possibility of this occurrence is the alternative we wish to discuss next for it is precisely this which has happened in the secularization which has been mentioned frequently. Precisely here the banishment of the divine from the historical scene has left the scene shining with pride. We have noted Bultmann's comment on this fact, that from the presence of God all creation shrinks in shame. With the disappearance of God comes the feeling (be it illusion or reality, this does not concern us here) that the secular world is self-sufficient, self-moved, self-satisfying.

To undertake such a discussion might seem perhaps to duplicate the mistakes of this present chapter in our next chapter, but it is not a priori certain that the removal of the religious element will merely provide the same intellectual dissonance in another key. It may as a matter of fact simply remove the dissonant element, namely the religious. What then of secularized eschatology?

To pose the question in precisely this way is already to prejudice the issue: "secular-ized" eschatology, merely from the derivation of the word, is already in trouble. Indeed it sounds as if we had taken a religious eschatology and corrupted it. Rather then than a truly secular eschatology it sounds as if we had an essentially religious eschatology which we had tried to purge of its religious impact while maintaining its essential structure. Instead of avoiding the problems of the badly put religious system, such a procedure could only maintain them while adding others. Rather we must say we intend to ask the question of secular eschatology. This shall be our next undertaking.

CHAPTER SIX

THE UTOPIAN CONCRETIZATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The attempt to concretize the hypothesis of the future from an epistemological presupposition into an operational methodology, and thereby to transform any transcendence it might have into total immanence, has been made, on scientific grounds, in chapter four. The attempt to elevate the epistemological presupposition of a hypothetical future into an ontological drama, i.e., into eschatology, has also been made, on religious grounds, in chapter five. Both attempts have been shown to contain a fundamental denial of the view of the future here advocated. The former speaks of the future as an abstract epistemological concept, devoid of any but the barest notion of humanity. It thus fails to grasp the necessity of hypothesizing a real, concrete future toward which one may direct the energies of humanity and in which one participates by anticipation. The latter speaks of the future as a fulfilled ontological realm, completely manifesting a notion of humanity wherein all is fulfilled. It thus fails to grasp the hypothetical nature of the "real, concrete future," which is projected, and thereby eliminates anticipation.

For both positions, the "scientific" and the eschatological, epistemology is the source of difficulties. The former pretends that the scientific object is fully constituted and thus overlooks an important subjective contribution. The latter pretends that humanity is fulfilled in certain individuals and that this can be transferred, as a model, to the human race. Both ignore the uniformitarian hypothesis _qua_ hypothesis while assuming its results as fact.

It may still be possible however, as we have said, to turn the Wagnerian trick of transforming the twilight of the gods into the dawn of the truly heroic man. It may still be possible, admitting both the necessity of an hypothesis of the future and the non-teleological nature of that future, to assert that the future yet contains the possibility of grandeur, nobility, and universal love--even though monumental endeavors may be required and tremendous energies expended in making it our own. This will be the consideration investigated in this chapter. It will be discussed as three forms of utopianism. The first is the utopianism of the French Enlightenment, the second is Marxism, and the third is that utopianism which asserts history's absolute transcendence of nature.

Several times this dissertation has casually remarked on the secularization of eschatological presuppositions. This must now be scrutinized more carefully. It is not the intended task of this chapter to recapitulate the history of modern thought in order to show in detail the almost systematic de-mythologizing and secularizing of religious hypotheses. Rather we shall but mention the presuppositions of the type of thought in question and juxtapose them with their religious counterparts. Since the developing of these transformations has been documented in such works as Becker's *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, Bury's *The Idea of Progress*, Lowith's *Meaning in History*, and numerous other works, it will not be repeated here. Rather however, certain aspects of human nature which are common to both the religious and non-religious modes of thought will be discussed. This chapter then is interested in philosophical anthropology, rather than in the history of ideas.

How then does eschatology get secularized? Or more precisely, what is the secular analogue to eschatology? In our terms, the factor which recommended eschatology for our inspection was its anticipation of an absolute future, of a *novus ordo seclorum* in which a perfected and fulfilled mankind should enjoy the blessings of its perfection perpetually. This was only possible on the basis of a religious fulfillment, initiated by God. The secular analogue to this aspect of eschatology is utopianism. Utopianism reflects the longing for the new order. Its self-assurance of its own possibilities and its expending of energies in order to accomplish its goals represent its participation, by faith, in its own fulfillment. The _cor curvum in se_ is overcome socially: it is the human community at large which will participate in the new order, not merely the individual.

In terms of the history of ideas, all such systems seek to ameliorate society. All begin with a recognition of the distance of existing society from the ideal and include a program for achieving the ideal. The French Enlightenment, during which time such utopian longings not only flourished but as well generated a significant literature, provides the best and most familiar example of this tendency. Post-Reformation Europe was obsessed with the power of reason for ending the ills of the world. Along with a deep respect for Christian ideals, the Enlightenment advanced an equally profound rejection of Christian methods, the net result being an elaborate description of the Medieval Period as a "dark age" in which true humanitarian enlightenment was squelched by the self-seeking of "bad priests." This first form of utopianism then is essentially negative in its motivation: it understands all too well the corruption of Christian eschatology in the hands of the Christian hierarchy and seeks, in Becker's terms, to "[demolish] the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials."[64] The _mauvais foi_ this generated is notorious. Again in Becker's words

> . . . at every turn the philosophes betray their debt to medieval thought without being aware of it. They denounced Christian philosophy but rather too much, after the manner of those who are but half emancipated from the "superstitions" they scorn. They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude toward the Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind. The Garden of Eden was for them a myth, no doubt, but they looked enviously back to the golden age of Roman virtue, or across the waters to the unspoiled innocence of an Arcadian civilization that flourished in Pennsylvania. They renounced the authority of the Church and Bible, but exhibited a naive faith in the authority of nature and reason. They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be called philosophers. They dismantled heaven, somewhat prematurely it seems, since they retained their faith in the immortality of the soul. . . . They defended toleration valiantly, but could with difficulty tolerate priests. They denied that miracles ever happened, but believed in the perfectibility of the human race. We feel that these Philosophers were at once too credulous and too skeptical. They were the victims of common sense. In spite of their rationalism and their humane sympathies, in spite of their aversion to hocus-pocus and enthusiasm and dim perspectives, in spite of their eager skepticism, their engaging cynicism, their brave youthful blasphemies and talk of hanging the last king in the entrails of the last priest--in spite of all of it, there is more of Christian philosophy in the writing of the Philosophes than has yet been dreamt of in our histories.[65]

In the terms of this dissertation the Enlightenment misfired for several reasons. The philosophes' shallow understanding of Christianity, while perhaps interesting, is not the principal cause here. Nor is the fact that the unwitting introduction of essentially Christian concepts compromises their programs. Rather it is their belief in Reason, writ large, which over-rides the recalcitrant tendencies of sluggish men on its way to some tremendous new theophany. This, coupled with the innocent belief in the accessibility of "facts," yielded an epistemology which seemed to generate knowledge of its own accord, knowledge of which man was the grateful recipient, rather than the author. It was a simple epistemology, then, of two parts: first are the facts, which are atomic, incorrigible, and unambiguously present; second is Reason, which was of itself infallible (although bad priests could obscure it), impersonal, good, beautiful, and holy--and inflexible. The program for the good life then was simple: enthrone Reason and obliterate the unreasonable. But such a program could not long sustain optimism in the Eighteenth Century. The land--whatever land--did not flow with milk and honey, and the programs (the Abbé de Saint Pierre alone proposed hundreds of them) quickly became more desperate. Soon the beatific vision was supported by cannon fire; and when the smoke had dissipated, so had the vision.

The fact however that history has rejected such a program does not necessarily save philosophy the trouble. The theses advanced by the Enlightenment optimism still occur in some of our literature today, still appear in otherwise respectable scientific journals, still as a matter of fact carry no small weight with the scientific community. And it is no surprise that this should be the place they occur, for, as we have argued here and in chapter four, both modes of thought are susceptible to the same error, namely of attempting to make "data" accessible by an act which standardizes critical contact. The hypothetical nature of such an enterprise has been remarked on. We do not wish to dismiss it because it is hypothetical. We simply wish to remind ourselves that it is hypothetical and cannot be otherwise, and that consequently very little can be said of "facts." To be sure there is also a problem here regarding the ability of human nature to complete itself. But this is best treated under a form of utopianism to be discussed later.

If the Eighteenth Century squandered its vision of the perfect state, giving it over into the hands of the "Happy Warrior" only to watch his total corruption and his rejection by the unenlightened of Europe (who evidently chose not to be forcibly benefitted), and if the Eighteenth Century lost thereby its vision of human perfectibility, the Nineteenth Century was not long in recovering it. Although Nineteenth Century England was held to literary moderation by the controlled Romanticism of Wordsworth during its first half, and was perhaps held to mediocrity in its second half by industrial squalor and Victorian gloom, such was not the case with Germany. In Germany new alliances of man with nature, with Spirit, with Will, with grandeur and with nobility occurred in the works of Goethe, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche. German historians celebrated the Volk and exalted Bismarck, praised the new age and blessed the Kaiser, the last if only because of his position in the New Reich. Among these giants were as well many lesser lights, such as Fichte, who declared in his last Address to the German Nation that his system would usher in the Golden Age, and Herder, who asserted the natural perfecting development of man, a development which could not be deterred. At the turn of the century this bravado finally moved to England, who decked herself for Prince Albert's Exposition--an extravaganza to amaze, delight, and amuse--which declared among other things that the Age of Progress was upon us.

That the disappointment of these millenial hopes, like other millenial hopes, had already been instituted, is undoubtedly true. In the history of ideas and states, two colossal World Wars taught us that the fruits of progress are not always sweet. In the terms of this dissertation, the idea of progress is an extrapolation from human history, an extrapolation, that is, from an incomplete object. Bury's The Idea of Progress deals with this issue very well, I think. First, the logic of intemperate optimism, which requires very few steps:

> 1)"The history of society presents a continuous alternation of light and darkness, reason and extravagance, humanity and barbarism; but in the succession of ages we can observe good gradually increasing in ever greater proportion." (Abbé de Morollet)[66]

> 2) So much for the past and present; as for the future, as Leibniz says, "the present is pregnant with it."[67]
> 3) To introduce a uniformitarian hypothesis, "It is possible to foresee events, if the general laws of social phenomena are known, and these laws can be inferred from the history of the past." (attributed to Condorcet)[68]
> 4) Finally collapsing the ages required for the history of the world "in whatever was the beginning of the world, the end will be glorious and paradisiacal beyond what our imaginations can now conceive."(Priestly)[69]

Following a Kantian lead, Bury proceeds to dismantle this argument epistemologically.

> Kant does not assert that because our moral reason must assume the possibility of this hypothetical goal [the ideal state] civilization is moving towards it. That would be a fallacy into which he was incapable of falling. Civilization is a phenomenon and anything we know about it can only be inferred from experience.[70]

Bury's final word on the matter of evolutionary progress then is from Huxley: "The theory of evolutionary progress encourages no millenial anticipations."[71]

These views of the possibility of perfecting the race take a common stand epistemologically. They begin with man as an empirical fact and argue to man perfected. We have seen that no epistemology is really adequate to such a task. Yet there remains one extremely widespread utopian view which is based on just such a fallacy, namely Marxism. This difficulty is explicitly treated in the writings of the French Marxist Roger Garaudy--a man whose opinion is to be valued for its lucidity if not for its Marxian orthodoxy.

Garaudy's From Anathema to Dialogue is of particular value, for it goes beyond the voluntary isolation which Marxist thought generally chooses for itself and attempts to address the European and American audience at large. The book is furthermore an attempt to engage Christianity in conversation, the choice of Christianity depending on its self-image, which Garaudy typifies as the

> religion of the absolute future, [which] will remain throughout all the stages of history: since no human project can be equal to the absolute plenitude for which every man hopes, there will always be men to affirm the reality of an absolute future which exceeds whatever may be realized.[72]

The questions which such a religion might and in the person of Fr. J. B. Metz has put to Marxism are as follows.

> 1. Will the realization of the total man give the final answer to man's questions, or will man, when fully developed, be still more the questioner, more capable still of an ever-expanding future? Will the future be filled with questions which exceed and transcend our projects and our tentative notions of the future? . . .
> 2. Where can a critical philosophy, such as Marxism, derive the negative capability which permits it to be dissatisfied with a given historical situation. Does it not come precisely from a reality which lies both behind and before the question, indeed contains the question, and which inspires in man both the nostalgia for "more-being" and the confidence in a future which is always in excess of anything that can be identified with any human project.
> 3. How, at the very heart of an alienated society--and until now there has been no other kind--, can we have any confidence in the impression of a promised future of fullness, when this future itself is nothing but our project as alienated men, when this future is not a redemptive future which, on its own comes towards us without ceasing? Our future can be this full openness

> only through the intimate experience of the
> Deus semper major who always exceeds our projects
> and our plans and who comes to our level of life,
> to the very heart of our freedom, our power,
> and our effort to transform the world.[73]

Fr. Metz' remarks typify Marxism--rightly I think--as offering a radical alternative to man's past to be sought and gained in the future. This future provides inspiration for the present, and it provides for a certain selectivity in reading the past: instead of writing the annals of crime perpetrated against a suffering humanity--instead of writing such annals and calling them history--let us rather record the suffering of humanity until--as is the case in this remarkable and revolutionary age--humanity becomes aware of the depth of its travail and of the fact that this travail is not necessary. This will further inspire men to rid themselves of their needless and desperate burden, to overwhelm the capitalists, and to create the classless society. In such a society the total man is possible.

Fr. Metz' questions then are as follows. The first asks of Marxism the same questions Bonhoeffer asks of Hegel: After fulfillment, what then? Hegel clearly could not satisfy Bonhoeffer. We shall see what Garaudy can reply. Fr. Metz' second question asks of Marxism the same question Bonhoeffer asked of Kant: What is implied in the fact of transcendental reference? Kant clearly could not account for knowledge of a transcendental object except negatively as a something always beyond and never known. We shall see what Garaudy can reply. Fr. Metz' third question raises epistemological issues which parallel Bonhoeffer's questions to Heidegger, for Fr. Metz questions how it is possible, in our terminology, for incomplete man, who knows by his longing that he is incomplete, to extrapolate to a completed future on the basis of present historic evidence. Fr. Metz' questions then speak to the central issues of this dissertation. His use of the phrase "Deus semper major" approximates our use of "revelation," for both terms recognize the possibility of definitive encounter coming to us from out of the future.

It must be admitted that in one sense Garaudy's reply is disappointing, for it reveals the impossibility of substantiating his fondest claims in the face of such a criticism as Fr. Metz'. In another sense, perhaps, this failure can be turned to some use. Garaudy's reply is as follows. To the first question he replies that

> What is true of knowledge is also true of action: man achieves a growing mastery over nature, society, and his future, but if his power ceases to grow, he will be ever-militant and never-triumphant, if only because he comes up against the final limitation which is death. He no more arrives at total "beatitude" to which he aspires than he arrives at "total knowledge." . . . Yes, the future will be filled with questions which surpass and transcend anything we can imagine about the future. Yes, man will always be capable of an always greater future.[74]

This reply clearly speaks to both the first and second questions of Fr. Metz. It as a matter of fact admits the open-ended nature of human society and of our future. It admits in principle that the future cannot be fully anticipated. In Bonhoeffer's terms it asserts the nature of thought as act and avoids the "ontic narcissism" of Hegel. It seems in fact to declare for Fr. Metz' position. But it also heightens the importance of Fr. Metz' third question, for the third uses this possibility of spontaneous novelty to argue for man's ability in history to respond to that which comes to him, and it takes man's alienation, his incompleteness, to be symbolic of his historic alienation and incompleteness. It declares that man's heart is restless so long as confined to history. And it questions the possibility of transforming history from within. It claims that man can only be understood historically on the basis of his past and that at any moment in history any attempt to hurl man into a new future which ignores the past or tries to escape it--even in one aspect, let us say its alienation--must end by leaving man rootless and, *mutatis mutandis*, totally alienated. The import of this is its assertion that historic man cannot propel himself into a transhistoric future because this would require an activity which historic man is not capable of, dependent as he is on receiving his nature out of the future.

Garaudy's reply is, I fear, not very helpful here:

> . . . Communism is not the end of history, but the end of pre-history, man's pre-history which is made up of the jungle-like encounters common to all class societies. "This social formation," Marx writes in his "Contributions to the Critique

> of Political Economy," "constitutes the closing chapter of the prehistoric state of human society."
> Authentically human history will begin with Communism. It will be a history which is no longer made up of class struggle and war.[75]

Rather then than end history, or transform it into "super-history," Garaudy's Marxism seeks to begin it. One senses that after all this is an admirable project, that the goal is worthy. Yet one also senses that somehow he has been tricked. Fr. Metz questioned the possibility of getting from the historic to the post-historic world. Garaudy has assured us of the possibility of getting from the pre-historic to the historic world. Surely Garaudy cannot be allowed to drop the question when all he has accomplished is the juggling of technical terms. Yet this is just what he does.

Both Enlightenment utopianism and Marxist utopianism nurse certain millenial hopes which can be traced at least to primitive Christianity. For both, man must accelerate himself into a beatific future. The impossibility of man's bringing history to transcend itself has already been shown to stem from epistemological considerations. There is however one further manner in which this transcendence has been proposed. Herder's "Apotheosis of Humanity" from the _Philosophy of the History of Man_ presents the problem of man's transcending himself in terms of nature.[76] Briefly the case is that nature is involved in a self-perfecting operation. Mankind is part of nature. Therefore perfect beatitude awaits mankind. This case of course strikes us as frivolous, and it is easily dealt with in the terms of this dissertation: Nature cannot be understood without a uniformitarian hypothesis (as chapter four has shown), yet such an hypothesis eliminates the possibility of the "objective" knowledge Herder must rely upon in order to make his case. Yet this suggestion, that man be thought of as historic and natural, the latter in the process of wholly eliminating the former, might well be attached to the utopian doctrine of progress. Such a program has indeed been tried, and it shall be our final consideration in this chapter.

The division between natural phenomena and historical phenomena is not an uncommon one. It is not our intent to trace its development here. In recent thought it can be attributed to Collingwood, Bultmann, Dilthey, Burckhardt, Erich Frank, and even Löwith. Weizsäcker spends much time in trying to overcome the distinction in his The History of Nature.[77] Others such as Heidegger, Sarte, and Nietzsche might be said to make the distinction, for they occasionally discuss history but seem not to know that nature exists, except Heidegger, who, in Gelassenheit, takes nature to be a great power supply. Hegel's influence here is notorious.[78]

Since we are dealing here with epistemological issues primarily, it is in epistemological terms that we must discuss the possibility of any such distinction. Here we may reiterate much of what has been said concerning that subjective contribution known as the uniformitarian hypothesis. In lieu of that we might also refer to Klibansky's paper on this subject, wherein he states that if the critical philosopher

> takes Kant's transcendental postulate seriously the separation into sciences of nature and sciences of the mind, which is determined by the assumption of a fixed existence of their objects, will not be admissible.[79]

The transcendental postulate we are asked to take seriously here is not the reference to a transcendental object which Bonhoeffer so thoroughly and not so originally criticizes, but the transcendental argumentation we have been engaged in all along, namely the eliciting of the presuppositions of human thought, specifically the reference to an hypothesized future.

The reference to the hypothesized future arises in a number of cases in this chapter. This is due to what has been described as an "anthropological" reason.[80] The "anthropological" characteristics which are common to the discussions here undertaken are to be thematically discovered in the epistemological reasoning of chapters one and two. They are as follows: first it is to be noted that "human nature" is "incomplete." In the first chapter this is discussed in terms of the historicity of experience, the "Faustian" desire for more and more experience, ever more diverse. For science it is inadequate technique. For Christianity it is (original) "sin." For Marxism it is "alienation." For all four positions there are various ways of concretizing this situation in order to deal with it. For science there is the present state of knowledge and the future state of knowledge. For Christianity there is the state of nature and the state of grace. For Marxism there is the capitalist system of exploitations and the communist classless society. In the more thematic terms of this dissertation there is the *cor curvum in se* and the community of love. All four positions recognize that the former, less desirable alternatives--the present state of knowledge, sin or the state of nature, alienated capitalistic society, and the *cor curvum in se*--are existent historical situations which are caused by forms of introversion having their sources respectively in the incompleteness of scientific research, in creaturely pride, in exploitation arising from greed, and in epistemologies which neglect the claims of the nature of thought as act. All four attempt to reorient man's attentions externally, enhancing them with hope--science by sublimation and assurance, Christianity by the forgiveness of sins, Marxism by the justification of means by ends, and this dissertation by "participation by anticipation." And all four have universalist implications, involving a technologically benefitted mankind, the Church Triumphant, the world-domination by Communism, and the universal community of love.

Yet despite these similarities, there are great differences, for "science," Marxism, and Christianity are utopian; this dissertation is not. "Science," or scientism deals with the transcendence of history by organization.[81] Christianity deals with the transcendence of history by eschatology; while Marxism deals with the transcendence of history by history. This last alternative, the transcendence of history by history, has been dealt with in three forms in this chapter. The first is the utopianism of the Enlightenment, naive and un-self-critical; the second is Marxism, which seeks to usher in the new age scientifically while remaining naive of the epistemology of scientific research; the third is the utopianism of an epistemologically untenable distinction, namely nature-history. More thematically, we have criticized the notion of history's self-transcendence, and we have shown the impossibility of generating an epistemology adequate to such tasks. Indeed the epistemology advanced in chapters one and two clearly forbids it, for such a program must deny the nature of thought as act and must claim to supersede critical involvement.

So we are left again with a middle way. Chapter four has discussed and refuted the hypotheses that the future is non-specifically committed and that history and it sublimations may be overcome. We have seen that it is simply not the case that history can be singled out, because of its epistemology, for dismissal by the critical mind. Chapters five and six have discussed the opposite alternative, namely the elevation of history to absolute significance. This has been done in both a religious and a secular framework. It was found here that we also have no justification for expecting history to generate absolutes. Epistemologically then we have no right either to exalt or to ignore history. But our discussion of epistemology has not concerned "history" so much as it has concerned "the future." We have exhausted the prototypical alternatives and have justified no conclusion about the future: our epistemology invokes the future but it allows no absolute commitment of the future. It would seem then that the hypothesis of the future as such tells us nothing startling about the future: evidently all we can expect from the future is more history. The hypothesis tells us not about the future, but about present epistemology. The strongest statement we can make about the hypothesis of the future thus concerns the present more than it concerns the future. This is, if true, a curious result. We shall have to discuss it further. This will be the task of chapter seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

We have argued that epistemology must be recursively valid. It must not put thought into a position, on the one hand, in which it considers itself absolute and fails to understand its own former wonder; nor can epistemology situate thought so that, on the other hand, it so tenaciously grasps at wonder that it ignores its own impulse to wisdom. The former, we have said, is the compromising of thought as act, the latter of thought as being.

Hence self-understanding must involve the impulse toward wisdom. Once this impulse is satisfied, as Hegel has rightly and elaborately demonstrated, philosophy is at an end. But we have seen that the speculative completion of philosophy by Kant and Hegel has failed to save the phenomena of consciousness--a grave shortcoming indeed for phenomenology. It does not then seem permissible to say that philosophy is at an end. Hence we have referred to the "concrete, psychophysical man."

For concrete, psychophysical man, we have seen, participation in the universal community of love and in the future (here by anticipation) are necessary for his self-understanding. It is in the community of love that Dasein's structures appear as "already given," i.e., are made known and acknowledged to pre-exist Dasein's consciousness of them. This participation reveals to Dasein, as Heidegger has correctly described, that his horizon is temporal. Yet for Heidegger Dasein's horizon retreats before his advance. His horizon is always at a distance. This is the limitation of the metaphor.

For concrete psychophysical man as we have described him, the having of such a horizon is not a possessing. It is a being possessed by one's horizon, not possessing it. The possessing of it is a self-enclosure, essentially no different from that which we found in our discussions of Kant and Hegel, and it is termed the *cor curvum in se*. This error arises, we have found, whenever Dasein disregards his own historicity.

The possibility that the model for epistemology which arises when Dasein recollects his historicity is no adequate model for human knowledge, but rather a special and singular case, has been treated with reference to scientific and religious knowledge. Both failed, except on our grounds, to give an adequate account of themselves. Both failed to yield a recursive epistemology.

Our epistemology has found a great deal of use for an hypothesis of the future. Yet we have carefully but firmly resisted the attempt on the part of scientism, eschatology, and utopianism to seize this hypothesis and turn it into an hypostatization. Hence Dasein's participation in thought necessarily presupposes a hypothesizing from incomplete evidence.

Such an incompleteness has led us to speak of faith, for, strictly speaking, such participation can only be called knowledge in an attenuated sense of the word. Yet, as we have argued against the attempt at eschatology, faith is a method, not an answer. The "having" of faith, the participation in essences by faith, does not perform the function knowledge would have performed: faith is no more adequate to grasping absolute knowledge than were the more dogmatic versions of epistemology we have rejected. "Faith is either a struggle or it is nothing."[82] The epistemology of faith is the only one adequate to ontology; but the factor which accomplishes this adequacy is not the absolute nature of faith, but the tentative nature of ontology.

But what does it mean to do tentative ontology? On the one hand--employing the subject-object polarity to explicate the point--it means that the object of knowledge--be it Dasein or an ordinary object--cannot be assumed to be complete. For scientific knowledge of the scientific object, for example, we have seen that we may not ignore the fact that science deals either with the ideal or with the statistical object. We remind ourselves of this fact by reference to the "uniformitarian hypothesis," which it must be remembered is an hypothesis. For self-knowledge of Dasein, on the other hand, we have seen that we must not fail to account for the fact that Dasein may yet meet further modification of his nature from the future. Dasein is temporal; Dasein comes to himself through time; Dasein knows the incompleteness of his self-knowledge; Dasein may thus expect further definitive encounter with as-yet-unknown aspects of himself, out of the future. This is merely an expectation repeatedly reinforced by experience, but never finally confirmed. As such it is but an instance of the uniformitarian hypothesis. As a particularly interesting case of this hypothesis, it occasions our reminding ourselves of the possibility of its repetition. Thus we speak of revelation.

Revelation has been used in this dissertation as a reminder of the fact that the openness of Dasein to definitive historical encounter must be maintained. Thus we can speak of revelation without speaking of God. Revelation is here a methodological operator, a technical term, chosen to remind us of an experiential condition of which we do not wish to lose sight. Thus we are unwilling, as has been shown in other terms, to perform a theological account of the historicity of Dasein. And thus we can admit with Dewart that '. . . there is no "divine plan" . . . history can fail.'[83] These two phrases of Dewart's seem incompatible when juxtaposed; what else could failure mean but the failure of the divine plan? What Dewart means here is that no divinely ordained outcome of history is guaranteed. This we are also willing to admit; indeed we are forced to admit it. But here again we are forbidden the right to convert this into the stronger statement that, for example, God does not act in history. That too is too much for our epistemology. Yet where exactly does this project of the participation in thought by faith get its unity? We have seen that the idea of the community is required for epistemological reasons. Only in the community can Dasein know the extent of the historicity and sociality to which he is already given over. As well the community provides the methodological access to the unity of thought, for, in the words of Fritz Medicus, "*The idea of humanity is the transcendent principle of all historical knowledge*. It is through it alone that historical knowledge acquires unity."[84]

Here again it becomes apparent, and we must reiterate, that the uniformitarian hypothesis, *qua* hypothesis, which as an essence-procuring operator we have found necessary, reveals to thought its own historicity. As well it reveals to thought the embarrassing lack of absolutes. We expect no absolutes from the historian. Yet our epistemology has in a sense made historians of us. Thus is instituted a permanent ambiguity; the "*da*" which we at an earlier point tried unsuccessfully to free from the apparent indivisibility of thought as act and thought as being is now seen to be permanently inextricable: the "da" is the methodological reminder of the unfulfilled nature of Dasein, just as was "revelation," the only difference being that "revelation" emphasizes Dasein's utter inability to perform this function for himself.

Stronger claims are not possible here. Essences, be they the essential characteristics of the scientific object or of Dasein, as we have seen, require a uniformitarian hypothesis. As such they can be but hypothetically constitutive prefigurations for us. We have discussed the question of meaning in history. In the light of the explicit self-restriction of our hypothesis, this question might here be rejected as presumptuous. If indeed it seems presumptuous, it must be remembered in what sense the question is put. Meaning represents the possibility of integration. It thus can only properly be attributed to the whole. Yet how can we hope to know the whole when we have found so very much difficulty in even knowing the parts. The answer is of course to be found in the nature of our undertaking, for we are here speaking of the attempt at knowledge per se, and without distinction according to object. The whole also requires an act of faith, a commitment by the community, as our examples of Communism and of the Church Militant may illustrate. Expecting no absolutes from the historian and respecting the uniformitarian hypothesis, we must expect the future to be historical. We have no right to expect it to be transcendental, beatific, heavenly, etc. We cannot expect the Second Coming or the classless society, although of course we can participate in them by faith, anticipating them hopefully.

Yet neither ought we to expect the opposite absolute. The nihilist claim that what can be destroyed ought to be must be rejected along with the Cartesian attempt to subdue all that can be subdued.[85] The attempt to discount history as "a pack of tricks we play on the dead" (Voltaire), as well is rejected. If indeed history were a pack of tricks, our recognition of the involvement with the future would make it a pack of tricks we play on the unborn. Yet playing tricks is surely too frivolous and too dangerous for our age.

Indeed the reference to danger is hardly accidental. Löwith, for example, calls history a discipline of suffering.[86] As well Medicus sets "the categories of history as *responsible doing* and *suffering*.[87] Here then, *en face de* Hegel, an agency for historical action is restored to man, even though the assertion that man is the sole actor in history is more than we can make, and even though the agency of the individual is quite limited and ambiguous indeed.

This dissertation advances the historian's knowledge as the model for all knowledge. In some respects this might be taken as an affront to our technologically-oriented "scientific" culture. Indeed a whole school of historians, after Leopold von Ranke, has capitulated to the scientific caricature of their task. They take themselves to be living in a world which is a complex of "data," data which they describe and arrange with childish glee. They are troubled only by the fact that their professional selectivity prevents them from including all the facts they have found. There are of course genuine issues for such historians; they may never fully sort out Abraham Lincoln's motivations during the Civil War and perhaps will never learn when Ambrose Bierce died. But the pensive and often melancholic brooding over a lost *Weltanschauung* which this dissertation might attribute to a truly committed historian is evidently foreign to them. The hypothetical nature of their enterprise, the fact that it might fail utterly, is lost on them. The fact that no configuration is complete until all are has no place in their systems. Toynbee, for example, attacks the problem of universalizing history without recognizing the difference between the universal and the merely general.

Von Ranke's school has been described, correctly I think, as desiring peace. Our points here, both positive and negative, have been well put by Charles A. Beard.

> Contemporary thought about history . . . repudiates the conception dominant among the schoolmen during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the opening of the twentieth century--the conception that it is possible to describe the past as it actually was, somewhat as the engineer describes a single machine. The formula itself was a passing phase of thought about the past. Its author, Ranke, a German conservative, writing after the storm and stress of the French revolution,

> was weary of history written for, or permeated by, revolutionary propaganda. He wanted peace. The ruling classes in Germany, with which he was affiliated, having secured a breathing spell in the settlement of 1815, wanted peace to consolidate their position. Written history that was cold, factual, and apparently undisturbed by the passions of the times served best the cause of those who did not want to be disturbed. Later the formula was fitted into the great conception of natural science--cold neutrality over against the materials and forces of the physical world. Truths of nature, ran the theory, are to be discovered by maintaining the most severe objectivity; therefore the truth of history may be revealed by the same spirit and method. . . . But the movement of ideas and interests continued, and bondage to conservative and scientific thought was broken by criticism and events . . . so-called neutral or scientific history reached a crisis in its thought before the twentieth century had advanced far on the way.[88]

In terms of an old distinction implicit here, von Ranke sought to accommodate history to science while this dissertation seeks the opposite. Accommodation of course is necessitated by the (Kantian) refusal to erect ultimate barriers between disciplines.

Still no commitment has been made, no stand has been taken on Lessing's desire for the "eternal duration of an elevated human condition." We have shown that such a duration as an historical event is not logically necessary. We have allowed that it is not impossible. But what are its prospects? It is at this point that the compression of events begins to close in upon us. To ask the prospects of such an occurrence is to return to the work-a-day world and look for vacancies where it might intrude. And here we must shoulder the burdens of sociology,political science, economics, etc. Here we must begin to talk of current political situations and crises, current prospects, current projects. Here we cease to talk of historicity and begin to talk of our present historical situation. And this is not a project for this dissertation--not merely because the future is unknown to us, not because of methodological difficulties, and certainly not because it is not crucial--this is no project for this dissertation because it is not _my_ task; it is ours. Strictly speaking, it is humanity's. Whatever course we take, either in genuine initiatory action or in reaction, it is _our_ course. Some will plot it, and others will suffer it; but all will own it.

This is the necessary conclusion of our epistemology, for the absolute ontology which would satisfy these questions is not available to us. Our acknowledgement of the loss of primitive contact, our recognition of the inaccessibility of pure reason, our refusal to compromise either the act-character of thought or its being-character,--all propel us into the totally interpreted world, a world where historicity is a necessary epistemological condition, a world in which we can function only on the basis of faith and anticipation, a world in which we can never answer our most pressing issues conclusively, but must always be open to the future for further revelatory disclosure. It is a world, in Bonhoeffer's terms, in which we can never 'hunt down the "_Da_"' of history. In such a world ambiguity seems our permanent destiny.

The idea of community does provide some reduction of this ambiguity. It does not, as we have seen, alleviate it altogether.

As for the "eternal duration of an elevated human condition," it is to be devoutly hoped for, to be participated in by anticipation, to be gained, if at all, by faith. But the precise forms this historical project will take is not a matter for dialectic, but for dialogue. It thus belongs to the but-partially-constituted universal human community.

Footnotes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1961), p. 264.

2. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Act and Being*, trans. Bernard Noble (New York, 1961), p. 13.

3. Bonhoeffer, p. 19, n. 2.

4. Bonhoeffer, p. 22.

5. Bonhoeffer, p. 24.

6. Karl Löwith, *Nature, History, and Existentialism* (Evanston, 1966), p. 127.

7. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers (London, 1961), v. 2, p. 168.

8. Bonhoeffer, p. 28.

9. Bonhoeffer, p. 28.

10. Bonhoeffer, p. 28.

11. Bonhoeffer, pp. 28f.

12. Bonhoeffer, p. 29.

13. Bonhoeffer, p. 30.

14. Bonhoeffer, p. 31.

15. Bonhoeffer, p. 32.

16. Bonhoeffer, p. 42.

17. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York, 1962), p. 50.

18. Bonhoeffer, p. 55.

19. Bonhoeffer, p. 58.

20. Bonhoeffer, p. 59.

21. Bonhoeffer, p. 63.

22. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1962), p. H427, n. xiii.

23. Bonhoeffer, p. 66.

24. Bonhoeffer, p. 69.

25. Bonhoeffer, p. 59.

26. Bonhoeffer, p. 70.

27. Bonhoeffer, pp. 31f.

28. Bonhoeffer, p. 75.

29. Bonhoeffer, p. 75.

30. Bonhoeffer, p. 111.

31. Bonhoeffer, p. 139.

32. Bonhoeffer, p. 119.

33. Bonhoeffer, p. 128.

34. Bonhoeffer, pp. 134f.

35. Bonhoeffer, p. 134.

36. Löwith, p. 123.

37. Bonhoeffer, p. 155.

38. Bonhoeffer, pp. 171f.

39. Bonhoeffer, p. 173.

40. Bonhoeffer, p. 180.

41. Bonhoeffer, p. 182.

42. For purposes of clarity, history as a discipline will be capitalized. When used in the more common sense, or indifferently, it will not be.

43. Jean-Paul Sartre, Théatre (Paris, 1947), p. 168.

44. According to at least one definition of revelation, namely Schleiermacher's, this surprise itself is sufficient to certify revelation, for revelation in his definition is "every new and original communication of the Universe to man." Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, trans. John Oman (New York, 1965), p. 89.

45. This is not the literary but the historical account of this period. It can be found in a more detailed form in Chapter IX, "The Kingdom of the Franks," of Bayard Taylor's *History of Germany* (New York, 1885).

46. Matthew Arnold, *The Poetical Works of Matthew Arnold*, ed. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry (London, 1950), pp. 210f., ll. 29-37.

Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! For the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

47. Percy Bysshe Shelley, *The Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley*, ed. Edward Dowden (London, 1926), p. 506.

I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that the sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

48. Kant, p. 458.

49. Maurice Blondel, *Carnets Intimes* (Paris, 1960), p. 60.

50. New York, 1947, pp. 31f.

51. Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1964), p. 188.

52. This is a standard allegorical interpretation of this passage (Luke 8:48) which literally applies to a restoration of health.

53. New York, 1957, p. 17.

54. Bultmann, p. 127.

55. Bultmann, p. 27. The characterization is of the prophet Daniel.

56. Bultmann, p. 41.

57. Bultmann, p. 90.

58. Bultmann, p. 109.

59. Bultmann, p. 142.

60. Bultmann, p. 122.

61. Bultmann, p. 150.

62. Bultmann, p. 155.

63. Edith Simon, The Reformation (Ridge Park, Illinois, 1965), p. 172. "He who wants to be saved should be so minded as if there were no human beings but he alone, and that the consolation and promise of God through all the Scriptures concerned him only."

64. Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1962), p. 31.

65. Becker, p. 31.

66. J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (New York, 1960), p. 193.

67. Bury, p. 194.

68. Bury, p. 212.

69. Bury, p. 221.

70. Bury, p. 217.

71. Bury, p. 345.

72. Roger Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue, trans. Luke O'Neill (New York, 1966), p. 60.

73. Garaudy, pp. 61f.

74. Garaudy, p. 90.

75. Garaudy, pp. 90f.

76. J. G. von Herder, "The Apotheosis of Humanity" from The Philosophy of the History of Man in The Library of the World's Best Literature, ed. Charles Dudley Warner (New York, 1897), v. 13, pp. 7259-7276.

77. C. F. von Weizsäcker, The History of Nature (Chicago, 1962).

78. Collingwood's use of the distinction deserves at least a few words. In the first place, in an early article Collingwood denied that any distinction can be made. For this, see his article "Are History and Science Different Kinds of Knowledge?" Mind. XXXI (1922), 443-451. His later use of just such a distinction, in The Idea of History (New York, 1956), seems to be of no particular value beyond extraneous erudition, except to delimit (rather artificially) his subject matter. The distinction is quite useless in ambiguous cases. For example, it is not uncommon to attribute part of the success of the American Revolution to the insanity of George III of England. Was this madness an historical or natural event? Collingwood's distinction maintains that history is that participation in time which undertakes its own distinctions, whereas nature is that participation in time which does not. It is hardly obvious how this distinction could settle the issue of our example.

79. Raymond Klibansky, "The Philosophical Character of History," Philosophy and History: The Ernst Cassirer Festschrift, ed. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York, 1963), p. 326.

80. See page 139 of this dissertation.

81. Of particular relevance here is the work of Roderick Seidenberg, Post-Historical Man: An Inquiry (Boston, 1957), which claims that the tendency to organize and collectivize into ever greater unity will eventually eliminate history as a significant human concern. History, according to Mr. Seidenberg, is about to become a thing of the past.

82. Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism, trans. John W. Doberstein (New York, 1961), p. 177.

83. Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief (New York, 1966), p. 196.

84. Fritz Medicus, "On the Objectivity of Historical Knowledge," Philosophy and History: The Ernst Cassirer Festschrift, p. 151.

85. Nicolas Riasanovski, A History of Russia (New York, 1963), p. 497. The remark, "What can be broken, should be broken," is attributed to Dmitrii Pisarev.

86. Löwith, Meaning in History, p. 143.

87. Medicus, p. 153.

88. "Written History as an Act of Faith," The American Historical Review, XXXIX, 2 (January, 1934), 219-229.

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